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TRUST TERM EXTENSION 
Reid Kress Weisbord* 
Abstract 
Over the last thirty years, most jurisdictions in the United States have 
repealed or abrogated the Rule Against Perpetuities, which prohibits 
perpetual donor control over property. This, in turn, has led estate planning 
practitioners to consider whether a trust created to comply with the Rule 
could, after the Rule’s repeal, be extended in perpetuity to provide for 
future generations of the settlor’s descendants upon petition of the trustee. 
Trust term extension in this context implicates fundamental questions 
about the purpose of a trust: For whose benefit—the beneficiaries’, the 
settlor’s, or the trustee/fiduciary’s—does the trust exist? This Article 
argues that the purpose of a private donative trust is to benefit beneficiaries 
selected by the settlor and that perpetual trust conversions are inconsistent 
with this purpose because they impair the interests of existing beneficiaries 
by converting remainder interests into less valuable life interests. Financial 
institutions serving as corporate fiduciaries, however, would further their 
own pecuniary interests by seeking perpetual trust conversions that extend 
the duration of commissions charged to the trust for performing 
administrative and managerial services. The possibility of trust term 
extension, therefore, not only implicates problems associated with dead 
hand control of property, but it also creates the potential for tension 
between corporate trustees and beneficiaries selected by the settlor. This 
Article, the first to examine the topic of trust term extension critically, 
argues that courts should reject trustee-proposed perpetual trust 
conversions for at least two reasons. First, modification should not be 
granted for the benefit of the fiduciary, particularly at a beneficiary’s 
expense. Second, an important recent trend in trust law has sought to favor 
the rights of living beneficiaries over a settlor’s right to exercise dead hand 
control over trust property, so evidence of what the settlor would have 
wanted but for the Rule should therefore not override vested beneficial 
interests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Trust law and the broader legal framework governing wealth transfers 
in the United States have been pulled in opposing directions. On one hand, 
dead hand control has tightened its grip. Donor-friendly reforms include a 
widespread retreat from the Rule Against Perpetuities that expands the 
permissible duration of  donor control over private gratuitous transfers and 
significant federal wealth transfer tax reforms that sweeten the donor’s 
2
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financial incentives to exercise that control. On the other hand, a different 
current of trust law reform has marked a modest shift in the balance of 
power away from the donor’s dead hand in favor of living beneficiaries. 
Donor-constraining reforms include exceptions to spendthrift trust 
protections, a lowering of the threshold for trustee removal, and an 
expansion of doctrines permitting trust modification and termination. 
These divergent trends reflect tension in trust law between the settlor’s 
right to exercise control over gifted property and the interests of 
beneficiaries for whose benefit the trust was created.1 This Article 
examines an important aspect of this tension—trust term extension. That 
is, could the duration of a trust settled in a jurisdiction governed by the 
Rule Against Perpetuities be extended indefinitely after the jurisdiction’s 
repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities?2 If so, the dead hand would seem 
to prevail over existing beneficiaries who would take in fee simple had the 
trust’s duration remained within the term contemplated by the original trust 
instrument. Would trust term extension, particularly when proposed by the 
trustee, be consistent with the underlying intent-fulfilling purposes of 
private donative trusts and, if so, would it actually serve to further the 
settlor’s interest in the trust? Or might this practice add another tension to 
the mix—a new source of conflict between fiduciaries and beneficiaries? 
This Article envisions a plausible situation in which an irrevocable trust 
is settled in a jurisdiction governed by the Rule Against Perpetuities and 
the settlor, in preliminary discussions with estate planning counsel, states 
that her primary objective is to convey property in trust for the benefit of 
several generations of descendants, both born and unborn. Counsel, 
however, advises the settlor that the Rule Against Perpetuities would 
invalidate the interests of distant unborn descendants because, at the time 
of the trust’s creation, those interests would not be certain to vest or fail to 
vest within the governing perpetuities period. As a result, following the 
advice of counsel, the settlor executes a trust instrument complying with 
the Rule: instead of creating beneficial interests spanning several future 
                                                                                                                     
 1. For an example of this tension, compare UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 (2010) (“A trust and its 
terms must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries.”), with id. § 412(a) (authorizing modification of a 
trust by court order under certain circumstances, but noting “[t]o the extent practicable, the 
modification must be made in accordance with the settlor’s probable intention”). For scholarship on 
the debate about whether to allow or contain dead hand control, compare Gregory S. Alexander, 
The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1257–64 
(1985) (discussing the two basic arguments undergirding objections to dead hand control), with 
Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 6–
14 (1992) (discussing traditional justifications for preserving testamentary freedom), and Scott 
Andrew Shepard, Which the Deader Hand? A Counter to the American Law Institute’s Proposed 
Revival of Dying Perpetuities Rules, 86 TUL. L. REV. 559 (2012) (criticizing arguments in favor of 
reviving the rule against perpetuities and offering alternative solutions to dead hand control).  
 2. For an overview of the Rule Against Perpetuities, see infra Part I. 
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generations of unborn descendants as the settlor would have liked, the 
executed trust limits its duration to only two generations below the settlor. 
If, after the settlor’s death, the relevant jurisdiction repeals or abrogates its 
Rule Against Perpetuities, could the trustee then petition for modification 
that would extend the trust’s duration beyond the perpetuities period in 
effect on the date of conveyance and add new generations of the settlor’s 
descendants as beneficiaries? Could a trust with existing residuary 
beneficiaries be converted into a trust of perpetual duration that provides 
additional asset protection for incumbent beneficiaries and new income or 
remainder interests for the benefit of the settlor’s unborn or later-born 
descendants?3 
Practitioners have explored the idea of extending a trust’s duration 
beyond its original perpetuities period through the use of an estate planning 
technique known as “trust decanting.”4 As originally conceived, this 
technique allowed the trustee to freshen a stale trust instrument by pouring 
all assets, distributable at the trustee’s discretion, into a new trust with the 
same beneficiaries while updating obsolete administrative and distributive 
terms.5 This Article considers the possibility that trustees may attempt to 
take the bolder step of seeking modification to extend a trust’s duration in 
perpetuity and create new beneficial interests for descendants of the settlor 
that were not named in the original instrument. Citing settlor intent, a 
trustee might argue that, had the settlor anticipated the Rule Against 
Perpetuities’ repeal, he would have wanted to extend the duration of the 
trust’s asset protection features and create beneficial interests for future 
unborn generations. 
                                                                                                                     
 3. Or, alternatively, what if the original trust provided that it should last for as long as the 
law would allow? 
 4. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al., An Analysis of the Tax Effects of Decanting, 47 REAL 
PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 141, 166 (2012) (“[E]xercising the authority to decant the trust to extend its 
duration beyond the GST rule against perpetuities would not appear to have an adverse effect on a 
trust exempt by reason of an allocation of GST exemption.”); William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani Bennett 
Mellen, Trust Decanting: An Overview and Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45 
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1, 25–26 (2010) (“[I]t may be possible to extend a [zero inclusion ratio] 
trust in a manner that would violate the [GST tax] regulatory safe harbors, such as by decanting the 
trust property to a perpetual or dynasty trust in a state that has repealed the traditional rule against 
perpetuities.”).  
 5. See William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani L. Bennett, Use of Trust Decanting to Extend the Term 
of Irrevocable Trusts, EST. PLAN., June 2010, at 1, 3–4 (“Trust decanting generally refers to the 
distribution of property from one trust to another trust pursuant to a trustee’s discretionary power to 
distribute property to or for the benefit of the trust’s beneficiaries. . . . A trustee with discretionary 
power to distribute property to or for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries . . . should be able to 
give the current beneficiaries . . . [powers of appointment] under the terms of the second trust that 
would be the functional equivalent of distributing the property outright to the beneficiaries.”). 
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Under the doctrine of equitable deviation, courts have the power to 
modify original trust terms or terminate a trust where, “because of 
circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modification or termination 
will further the purposes of the trust.”6 The doctrine is commonly 
understood to mitigate dead hand control by authorizing relief from settlor-
imposed restrictions where unanticipated circumstances render compliance 
with existing terms inconsistent with the trust’s broader purpose.7 Settlors 
cannot opt out of the court’s modification power,8 so the mandatory 
                                                                                                                     
 6. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a); see also Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: 
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1182 (2013) (noting that the 
doctrine of equitable deviation permits a court to “modify an administrative or distributive 
provision of a trust, or direct or permit the trustee to deviate from an administrative or distributive 
provision, if because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor the modification or deviation 
will further the purposes of the trust” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1), at 492 
(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 7. See Alan Newman, The Intention of the Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code: Whose 
Property Is It, Anyway?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 649, 658–59 (2005) (“While [equitable deviation] and 
other UTC provisions that provide greater flexibility with respect to the modification and 
termination of trusts were designed to be consistent with ‘the principle that the primary objective of 
trust law is to carry out the settlor’s intent,’ they lessen the ability of the settlor to control the 
enjoyment of trust property by its beneficiaries.” (footnote omitted) (quoting David M. English, The 
Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 169 
(2002))); Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43, 77 
(2008) (stating that, in the restricted charitable gift context, “traditional Anglo-American legal 
doctrine gives two basic ways to remove or modify dead hand control of charitable assets: equitable 
deviation and cy pres”); Rob Atkinson, The Low Road to Cy Pres Reform: Principled Practice to 
Remove Dead Hand Control of Charitable Assets, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 97, 138 (2007) 
(observing, in the semi-analogous context of dead hand control over charitable assets, that 
“[t]raditional doctrine gives two basic ways to remove or modify dead hand control of charitable 
assets: equitable deviation and cy pres”) ; John K. Eason, Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions 
in Charitable Naming Gifts: When Good Names Go Bad, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 423 (2005) 
(stating that, in the restricted charitable gift context, “[t]he doctrines of cy pres and equitable 
deviation present a pervasive means by which donees may escape or circumvent the particulars of 
naming conditions”); John K. Eason, The Restricted Gift Life Cycle, or What Comes Around Goes 
Around, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 693, 729 (2007) (stating that, in the restricted charitable gift context, 
“[c]y pres and equitable deviation are the primary ‘orthodox’ routes to dealing with problematic 
donor restrictions”); Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs. 
Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1108 (2005) (stating that, in the restricted charitable 
gift context, assertion that administrative deviation provides an “avenue[] of legal relief” for a 
charity to “to free [donor-]restricted funds for other projects and purposes”); Adam J. Hirsch, 
Freedom of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2241 (2011) (“[M]eans 
whereby lawmakers restrain the dead hand . . . grant[] courts power to modify estate plans over 
time.”); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 1, at 51 (describing trust modification as a means of obtaining 
“relief” from donor-imposed restrictions); Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor’s Intent, 
53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595, 607–08 (2005) (describing the expanded formulation of equitable 
deviation as among the doctrines that grant “beneficiaries and courts more power to terminate or 
modify trusts” notwithstanding restrictions imposed by the settlor). 
 8. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4). 
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availability of modification doctrines limit the dead hand’s power to 
control property in the face of unforeseen events and changed 
circumstances.9 But legal scholarship has largely overlooked the doctrine’s 
countervailing potential to strengthen dead hand control at the cost of 
impairing the interests of existing beneficiaries. This Article will consider 
that potential in the context of trust term extension, where the settlor’s 
failure to anticipate a change in the law—the repeal of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities—could be offered by the trustee as a reason to expand the 
reach of the settlor’s dead hand. 
The factual illustration above implicates a core tension in trust law 
between settlors and beneficiaries because the interests of existing 
beneficiaries would be impaired to facilitate what would arguably 
constitute an expansion of the settlor’s objectives. Examining that tension, 
this Article will evaluate the merits of trust term extension within the 
larger context of legal reform affecting the scope of dead hand control: the 
widespread repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities and, in contrast, recent 
signs of a retreat away from dead hand control in certain aspects of trust 
law doctrine. So far, the dead hand appears to have won the upper hand. 
Although the broader law of trusts has undergone reforms that provide 
greater protection for beneficiaries, powerful interests support the 
expansion of dead hand control, including financial institutions that could 
potentially benefit from additional fees derived from administering 
perpetual trusts. This Article argues that modification extending the 
duration of a trust beyond the perpetuities period in effect at the time of 
conveyance would constitute a misapplication of the doctrine of equitable 
deviation, and would be inconsistent with a modern trend in trust law of 
providing greater protection for living trust beneficiaries. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I surveys the doctrinal ingredients 
for trust term extension—a wealth transfer law framework shaped by dead 
hand control and the Rule Against Perpetuities. Part II explores practical 
considerations that a party, such as the trustee, might weigh in deciding 
whether to file a petition to extend the duration of an existing trust. Part III 
examines the doctrine of equitable deviation and its potential application to 
modify the duration of an irrevocably settled trust. Part IV considers the 
issue of trust term extension within the larger context of legal reform 
governing dead hand control of property, assesses its potential for misuse 
by corporate fiduciaries, and offers recommendations for law reform. 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 687 (9th ed. 
2013) (explaining that the doctrine of equitable deviation, as a doctrine permitting a court to modify 
or terminate a trust, may represent a limit on a settlor’s freedom of disposition “and therefore the 
reach of the dead hand”).  
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I.  DEAD HAND CONTROL AND THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 
Although debate about the permissible duration of dead hand control 
has stewed for centuries,10 it continues to attract attention from leading 
property law scholars and policy makers today.11 Advocates of dead hand 
control argue that principles of testamentary freedom vest the donor with 
power to dictate the future use of property and that, when exercised, dead 
hand control tends to manifest in the form of legitimate “principal-
preserving” and “gate-keeping” objectives to protect future distributions—
neither of which have a pernicious effect on society.12 Opponents of dead 
hand control argue that: (1) perpetual or long-term dead hand control often 
creates inflexible restrictions that fail to account for a change of 
circumstances, thereby impairing the usefulness and value of property 
subject to the deceased donor’s lingering restrictions;13 (2) on average, the 
settlor’s descendants tend to balloon in population with the passage of 
time, creating the possibility of tens of thousands of beneficiaries and an 
unmanageable administrative task for the trustee;14 and (3) even when 
restrictions are sufficiently flexible, as a normative proposition, scholars 
have argued that dead hand control should be curtailed because it 
exacerbates the unequal distribution of resources in society by 
concentrating wealth and creating stasis within the upper class.15 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 1, at 17 & n.63 (citing critics of dead hand control, 
including Adam Smith, dating back to the seventeenth century).  
 11. Compare Lawrence W. Waggoner, From Here to Eternity: The Folly of Perpetual Trusts 
4–10 (Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-007, 2013), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1975117 (arguing that, if settlors were to contemplate the sheer 
volume of future beneficiaries numbering in the hundreds of thousands, they might not be inclined 
to create a perpetual trust), with Shepard, supra note 1, at 605 (arguing that concern over dynastic 
wealth is not a problem best addressed by dictating the permissible duration of dead hand control, 
but rather by tax policy governing the transfer of wealth). 
 12. Shepard, supra note 1, at 591 (“[C]ontrol exerted by the modern dead-hand proves mostly 
beneficial, or at least neutral.”). 
 13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27, intro. 
note, at 549 (2010) (noting that “[t]he policy [of the rule against perpetuities] was this: given that 
one can, to a limited extent only, foresee the future and the problems it will generate, landowners 
should not be allowed to tie up lands for periods outside the range of reasonable foresight.” 
(quoting A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY 159–60 (1987))). 
 14. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Congress Promotes Perpetual Trusts: Why? 18–20 (Law & 
Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-015, 2013), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2326524. 
 15. For example, Professor Lewis Simes argued:  
It is socially desirable that the wealth of the world be controlled by its living 
members and not by the dead. I know of no better statement of that doctrine than 
the language of Thomas Jefferson, contained in a letter to James Madison, when 
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For centuries, Anglo-American law balanced these concerns through 
the imposition of a Rule Against Perpetuities that curtailed dead hand 
control by limiting the permissible duration of restrictions governing the 
use or enjoyment of property transferred to a private, noncharitable 
donee.16 Originating in seventeenth-century England,17 the Rule invalidates 
contingent future interests in property that are uncertain to vest (or fail to 
vest) “not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the 
creation of the interest.”18 Under the Rule, the interest of a person unborn 
or unascertained at the time of conveyance is contingent upon that person 
being born or ascertained.19 For property held in trust, the Rule limits the 
number of successive generations the settlor may include as beneficiaries 
because, at the time of the trust’s creation, remote generations are unborn 
or unascertained and, therefore, their interests are not certain to vest within 
a life in being plus twenty-one years.20 The Rule has been incorporated 
                                                                                                                     
he said: “The earth belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it 
then, and what proceeds from it, as they please during their usufruct.” 
LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 59 (1955) (footnote omitted); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27 intro. note, at 561 
(“[T]he perpetual or near-perpetual trust movement could . . . lead to large concentrations of wealth 
within a relatively small number of family dynasties and financial institutions . . . .”); 6 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.3, at 412–13 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) (stating that the main social and 
economic objections to direct restraints on alienation are that the restraints “take the property out of 
commerce” and tend to “concentrate wealth”); Alexander, supra note 1, at 1258 (“[R]eference to 
the dead hand evokes images of aristocracy and wealth inequality based on feudal-like hierarchy.”); 
Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 87 (1990) (“The inescapable 
conclusion is that society has a major stake in all accumulated wealth. Given that stake, society need 
not continue to allow decedents nearly unlimited control over the disposition of their property after 
death.”); Sarah Harding, Perpetual Property, 61 FLA. L. REV. 285, 296 (2009) (noting the 
“economic” reproach of dead hand control that unrestricted arrangements for the distant future are 
“likely to result in an inefficient use of resources brought about by unforeseen contingencies” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 16. See JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 2.1, at 4 (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed. 
1942) (“The system of rules disallowing restraints on alienation and the Rule [A]gainst Perpetuities 
are the two modes adopted by the Common Law for forwarding the circulation of property which it 
is its policy to promote.”); id. § 4, at 4 (providing that the Rule Against Perpetuities “is the law 
limiting the time within which future interests can be created”); Harding, supra note 15, at 296–97. 
The limitation contains an exception for “a trust or other donative disposition of property solely for 
charitable purposes.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 27.3(2), at 604. 
 17. Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 215, 
229 (2011) (“The Rule derives from the Duke of Norfolk’s Case, decided by the Court of Chancery 
in 1682.”).  
 18. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 166 (2d ed. 1906). 
 19. For a lucid and concise illustration of how the Rule Against Perpetuities limits the 
duration of donor control, see Gallanis, supra note 17, at 229–30. 
 20. See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Lurking Rule Against Accumulations of Income, 100 NW. U. L. 
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expressly into the law of trusts, which requires the settlor to select 
beneficiaries who can be identified or ascertained “within the period and 
terms of the rule against perpetuities.”21 As Professor Ray Madoff 
explains, “[t]he theory of the Rule is that a person should be able to impose 
restrictions only on people whom he or she knows plus the period of 
minority for the next immediate generation.”22 
Over the last thirty years, however, most jurisdictions in the United 
States abrogated or repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities by statute to 
permit perpetual or near-perpetual trusts.23 This Article is the first to 
examine critically the implications of repeal for trusts that were created 
while the Rule remained in effect. If a state previously prohibited but now 
allows for perpetual dead hand control, should that allowance apply to 
trusts settled before the Rule’s repeal? If it is known that the settlor would 
have wanted a trust to last forever, should the law allow the trustee to 
petition for an extension of the trust’s duration in perpetuity? It is 
important to consider these questions for several reasons. First, the law of 
trusts must address whether the settlor’s freedom of disposition includes 
the trustee’s right to seek perpetual extension of an existing trust after the 
settlor’s death. Second, jurisdictions that have repealed or abrogated the 
Rule Against Perpetuities must consider whether doctrines of trust law 
should enable retroactive application of the Rule’s repeal where 
retroactivity might not have been intended by the legislature as part of its 
repeal legislation. Third, in states where the Rule remains in effect, 
legislatures presented with proposals to repeal the Rule should carefully 
consider the implications for existing trusts and the conflict of interest 
faced by trustees in seeking to extend the duration of a trust on behalf of a 
deceased settlor. 
II.  PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE DECISION TO 
SEEK TRUST TERM EXTENSION 
This Part surveys some of the practical considerations that might affect 
a trustee’s decision to seek modification extending the duration of a trust. 
Those considerations include: (a) the settlor’s intent and purposes for 
                                                                                                                     
REV. 501, 502–03 (2006) [hereinafter Sitkoff, The Lurking Rule].   
 21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 44, at 195 (2003) (“A trust is not created, or if created 
will not continue, unless the terms of the trust provide a beneficiary who is ascertainable at the time 
or who may later become ascertainable within the period and terms of the rule against 
perpetuities.”); accord UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402 (2010) (providing that “[a] trust is created only 
if . . . the trust has a definite beneficiary” and that “[a] beneficiary is definite if the beneficiary can 
be ascertained now or in the future, subject to any applicable rule against perpetuities”).  
 22. RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW 77 (2010). 
 23. Grayson M.P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 
1291, 1294 & n.9 (2013) (noting that the Rule “suddenly fell victim to a frenzy of legislative repeal 
after 1986 as state legislatures rushed to authorize perpetual trusts”); see infra Section IV.A.  
9
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creating the trust; (b) retroactive applicability of the state’s repeal of the 
Rule Against Perpetuities; (c) transfer tax implications of term extension 
and the creation of new beneficiaries; (d) limitations imposed by the 
Bankruptcy Code and state fraudulent transfer laws; and (e) the trustee’s 
potential conflict of interest in postponing the trust’s termination. 
A.  Settlor’s Intent 
The settlor’s intent should be the starting point for any inquiry into the 
possibility of trust term extension.24 A party seeking to extend the term of a 
trust—in many cases, the trustee—might assert various justifications for 
modification based on the settlor’s material purpose for creating the trust:25 
Perhaps clear evidence exists to show that the settlor intended to create a 
perpetual trust, but she was dissuaded from doing so by counsel’s advice 
regarding the Rule Against Perpetuities. Perhaps the settlor was adamant 
about protecting trust assets from the beneficiaries’ creditors through the 
repose of discretion in the trustee and the restraint on alienation imposed 
by a spendthrift provision. Perhaps the settlor created the trust to facilitate 
trustee supervision of the beneficiaries’ needs, a purpose inconsistent with 
outright distribution of the trust corpus to remainder beneficiaries. Perhaps, 
since empirical research suggests that most perpetual trusts are motivated 
by tax considerations,26 the settlor wanted to delay the trust’s termination 
indefinitely to avoid subjecting property to estate and gift taxes imposed on 
transfers by future generations. Perhaps evidence of a settlor’s intent to 
create a dynasty trust27 might be found in a “Kennedy Clause,” which 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1, at 
276 (2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is 
the donor’s intention.”). 
 25. This Article does not address a trust providing expressly for as many generations of 
descendants as the law allows because such a trust would not have to be modified to provide for 
future generations and its enforceability would depend simply on the jurisdiction’s retroactive 
application of the Rule Against Perpetuities’ repeal. See infra Section II.B. 
 26. Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: 
An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 362 (2005); see infra Section 
IV.A. 
 27. Commenting on why settlors might choose to establish a dynasty trust, Professor Joshua 
Tate observes: 
While most settlors certainly want to pass tax savings down to their descendants, 
that is not the only apparent goal: settlors also wish to protect their wealth from 
being wasted and to encourage their descendants to be productive members of 
society. Moreover, although it may be true that most settlors do not care about 
their unborn descendants, some of them might, and those who do probably want 
their spendthrift provisions and restrictions on the use of funds to continue 
indefinitely. 
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practitioners use to maximize a trust’s duration.28 For these reasons and 
perhaps others, the idea of using trust decanting to create a perpetual trust 
has surfaced among practitioners.29 
B.  Retroactive Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities 
The legality of extending a trust’s duration beyond the perpetuities 
period in effect at the time of conveyance may depend in large part on 
whether the trust’s jurisdiction limits retroactive application of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities’ repeal. In some states, repeal applies only to property 
interests created after the effective date of the repeal statute.30 In those 
states, the statutory limitation on retroactive application of repeal would 
seem to preclude a court from extending a trust beyond the perpetuities 
period because the beneficial interests, however modified, would have 
arisen under the old trust created before the repeal statute’s effective date. 
But it is also possible that a court could apply common law or statutory 
doctrines of “trust decanting” to create a new trust bypassing the effective 
                                                                                                                     
Tate, supra note 7, at 620. On the other hand, in states that repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities 
before Congress enacted the generation skipping transfer tax (GST tax), see infra Section II.C., the 
response by settlors was not overwhelmingly enthusiastic:  
Before 1986, three states—Wisconsin, South Dakota, and Idaho—had abolished 
the Rule by statute or had never adopted the Rule in the first place, but it appears 
that transferors had little desire to take advantage of the absence of a Rule in those 
states in order to establish perpetual trusts for their descendants from time to time 
living forever. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27, intro. note, at 554 
(2010). 
 28. A Kennedy Clause is an estate planning technique used to extend the duration of a trust in 
jurisdictions governed by the Rule Against Perpetuities. For purposes of trust termination under the 
Rule Against Perpetuities, a Kennedy Clause adopts an extraneous person, such as the last to die of 
all descendants of Joseph P. Kennedy, as the measuring life. See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier, Dynasty 
Trusts: Sheltering Descendants from Transfer Taxes, 23 EST. PLAN. 417, 419 (1996). 
 29. See, e.g., Blattmachr et al., supra note 4, at 166 (“[E]xercising the authority to decant the 
trust to extend its duration beyond the GST rule against perpetuities would not appear to have an 
adverse effect on a trust exempt by reason of an allocation of GST exemption.”); Culp & Mellen, 
supra note 4, at 26 (“[I]t may be possible to extend a [zero inclusion ratio] trust in a manner that 
would violate the [GST tax] regulatory safe harbors, such as by decanting the trust property to a 
perpetual or dynasty trust in a state that has repealed the traditional rule against perpetuities.”); Culp 
& Bennett, supra note 5, at 3 (“A trust decanting statute that is coupled with a statutory repeal of 
the rule against perpetuities potentially provides a powerful mechanism to extend the term of 
irrevocable trusts. . . . [I]t may be possible to extend the life of irrevocable trusts beyond the term 
traditionally allowed by the common law rule against perpetuities.”). 
 30. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.070 (2014). 
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date of the Rule’s repeal.31 In other states, however, repeal of the Rule 
applies to all trusts “whenever created.”32 In those states, the effective date 
of the repeal statute would not prevent modification extending the trust’s 
duration beyond the perpetuities period in effect on the date of conveyance.  
C.  Transfer Tax Implications 
Modification of a trust’s duration or beneficial interests can have 
transfer tax consequences, some of which could militate against trust term 
extension. At the federal level, excise taxes are imposed on the transfer of 
wealth during life (the gift tax),33 at death (the estate tax),34 and 
additionally, on wealth transfers skipping one or more generations (the 
generation skipping transfer tax, also known as the “GST tax”).35 
Modification of existing beneficial interests may be treated for tax 
purposes as a fresh transfer that can in turn give rise to adverse tax 
treatment for either the property held in trust or the beneficiaries.  
The Gift Tax. Adverse gift tax implications can arise when a 
modification of trust terms creates beneficial interests for new beneficiaries 
at the cost of impairing existing interests of incumbent beneficiaries. The 
cost borne by the incumbent beneficiary and the corresponding benefit to 
the new beneficiary could be treated as a transfer of property by gift from 
the incumbent beneficiary to the new beneficiary, thereby subjecting the 
incumbent beneficiary to gift tax liability.36 However, gift tax liability may 
be avoidable if the existing beneficiary is not also the trustee seeking 
modification and the existing beneficiary objects to the modification.37 The 
inquiry would focus on whether the incumbent beneficiary has exercised 
sufficient control over the property such that the incumbent beneficiary has 
                                                                                                                     
 31. See generally Culp & Bennett, supra note 5 (discussing the use of trust decanting to 
extend the terms of irrevocable trusts). 
 32. See, e.g., 76 Del. Laws 101 (2008) (repealing the Rule Against Perpetuities by way of an 
amendment to DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 25, § 503, making the amendment effective for all “trusts 
whenever created”). 
 33. I.R.C. § 2501 (2012). 
 34. Id. § 2001(a). 
 35. Id. § 2601. For an overview of the GST tax, see infra Section IV.A. 
 36. See Culp & Mellen, supra note 4, at 26. 
 37. Cf. id. at 26–29 (“[A] trustee’s exercise of a decanting power should not raise gift tax 
issues unless either: (1) the trustee exercising the power to decant is a beneficiary; or (2) a 
beneficiary’s consent is required to exercise the trustee’s power to decant.” (footnote omitted)). A 
court-ordered trust term extension would not appear to trigger the “Delaware Tax Trap,” an arcane 
provision of the gift tax governing the exercise of powers of appointment postponing the vesting of 
a property interest because the provision applies only to powers of appointment, not modifications 
pursuant to a court order. See I.R.C. § 2514(d); Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-1(b) (2013) (defining “power 
of appointment”). For a more detailed explanation of the Delaware Tax Trap, see generally Culp & 
Bennett, supra note 5, at 9–10. 
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effectively given away his own property interest.38 If the incumbent 
beneficiary were also the trustee, then the decision to extend the trust’s 
duration would constitute an exercise of control, which in turn, might be 
treated as a gift to the new beneficiaries.39 An incumbent beneficiary’s 
consent to modification by a third party trustee might also reflect some 
exercise of control over the trust interest sufficient to constitute a transfer 
of property by gift.40  
The Estate Tax. Modification is unlikely to affect the settlor’s estate tax 
liability because the inquiry here is confined to an irrevocable trust created 
by a deceased settlor.41 Posthumous amendment to an irrevocably settled 
trust does not affect the amount of property that has already passed from a 
settlor at death so, ordinarily, there would be no need to reopen a finalized 
estate tax return in light of this type of modification.42  
The GST Tax. Adverse GST tax implications can arise for irrevocable 
trusts created on or before September 25, 1985, the effective date of the 
GST tax.43 When Congress enacted the GST tax, the Treasury Department 
promulgated regulations categorically exempting trusts that became 
irrevocable before the GST tax’s effective date.44 A GST tax-exempt trust, 
however, loses its exempt status upon judicial modification that: (1) shifts 
a beneficial interest to a person occupying a lower generation than the 
original beneficiary; or (2) extends “the time for vesting of any beneficial 
interest in the trust beyond the period provided for in the original trust.”45 
This rule would be a significant consideration for a party seeking trust term 
extension because, under the illustration contemplated above, modification 
of the trust would add beneficiaries occupying a lower generation than the 
original beneficiaries and extend the time for the vesting of interests. 
Distributions from the modified trust would therefore likely be subject to 
the GST tax. The first $5.34 million of post-1985 generation-skipping 
transfers are subject to a separate exemption under 26 U.S.C. § 2631 (as of 
                                                                                                                     
 38. See Robert B. Smith, Reconsidering the Taxation of Life Insurance Proceeds Through the 
Lens of Current Estate Planning, 15 VA. TAX REV. 283, 307 n.93 (1995) (“To avoid subjecting the 
beneficiary to gift tax with respect to trust property, however, it is necessary to avoid giving the life 
beneficiary either a fixed right to any of the trust property or its income and control over the 
decision to distribute to any other person any of the trust income or property which is subject to the 
beneficiary’s fixed right.” (emphasis added)).  
 39. Culp & Mellen, supra note 4, at 27–28.  
 40.  See id. at 28–29.  
 41. See id. at 26 (noting the limited circumstances under which modification, by way of trust 
decanting, would give rise to adverse estate tax consequences). 
 42. See id. at 26, 29 (“It is possible for a trust decanting or modification to cause a shift of 
beneficial interests that is a taxable transfer for gift tax purposes.”).  
 43. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(i) (2013). 
 44. Id. (providing that “[t]he provisions of chapter 13”—i.e., the GST tax—“do not apply to 
any generation-skipping transfer under a trust . . . that was irrevocable on September 25, 1985”). 
 45. Id. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(D). 
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2014),46 but under current regulations, it is unclear whether the settlor’s 
unused GST tax exemption amount could be applied to a modified trust.47 
Tax consequences for trusts created after the GST tax effective date are 
more benign. For example, a trust created after September 25, 1985, could 
be entirely or partially exempt from the GST tax if the settlor allocated 
some or all of her GST tax exemption amount under 26 U.S.C. § 2631 to 
the trust.48 The modification rules governing pre-1985 trusts do not apply 
to post-1985 trusts, so a trust containing property exempt under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 2631 could likely be modified without adverse GST tax consequences.49 
Thus, the trust would be no worse off due to the modification because the 
exemption under 26 U.S.C. § 2631 would apply either way. 
D.  Bankruptcy and Fraudulent Transfer Law 
A party petitioning for modification to a trust that would adversely 
affect the vested interest of a beneficiary who is insolvent, nearly insolvent, 
or bankrupt should proceed with extreme caution. Under the Bankruptcy 
Code, the beneficiary’s vested interest in the trust would most likely be the 
property of the beneficiary’s bankruptcy estate unless an exception 
applies,50 so a bankruptcy trustee will likely object to any attempt to 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Note the distinction between a GST tax-exempt trust, which is categorically exempt from 
the GST tax because it was created before the statute’s effective date, and the GST exemption, 
which excludes from the GST tax the first $5.34 million (as of 2014) of generation-skipping 
transfers made by the settlor after the statute’s effective date. I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3) (2012) (providing 
that the GST tax exemption amount is $5 million plus inflation for any decedent dying after 2011); 
Frequently Asked Questions on New Tax Rules for Executors, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Frequently-Asked-Questions-
on-New-Tax-Rules-for-Executors#24 (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (“Under current legislation, the 
applicable exclusion amount for estates and generation-skipping transfers . . . . for 2014 is 
$5,340,000.”). 
 47. See Culp & Mellen, supra note 4, at 22.  
 48. I.R.C. §§ 2631–32. 
 49. See Culp & Mellen, supra note 4, at 25–26 & n.159. 
 50. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012) (providing that “all legal or equitable interests of the 
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case” becomes property of the bankruptcy estate). 
Note, however, that “[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that 
is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable” under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. 
§ 541(c)(2); see also Wetzel v. Regions Bank, 649 F.3d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that under 
both applicable federal and state law, the beneficiary’s interest in the net income of a trust would be 
property of the bankruptcy estate “unless an exception applies” and that “[o]ne such exception is 
described in § 541(c)(2),” which provides that an enforceable restriction on the transfer interest of a 
beneficial interest of the debtor in trust is also enforceable under bankruptcy law). Therefore, 
pursuant to § 541(c)(2), if a trust restricts the transfer of a debtor-beneficiary’s interest in the 
distributions of net income from the trust, and such restriction is enforceable under applicable law, 
then the beneficiary’s “interest in the distributions of net income from [the trust] is not property of 
[the beneficiary’s] bankruptcy estate.” Wetzel, 649 F.3d at 835; see also Gladwell v. Harline (In re 
Harline), 950 F.2d 669, 670 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 
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modify the trust in state court as a willful violation of the automatic stay of 
proceedings with regard to the property interests of the beneficiary-qua-
debtor.51 An attempt by the trust’s trustee to further insulate the 
beneficiary’s interest in the trust by extending asset protection features, 
such as the repose of discretion in the trustee or spendthrift protection,52 
may be viewed by the bankruptcy trustee as an attempt to hinder the 
creditor’s collection of assets in bankruptcy. Willful violation of the 
automatic stay can give rise to punitive damages.53 The bankruptcy trustee 
may also seek to set aside transfers of property interests up to two years 
before the debtor’s bankruptcy petition if, in conjunction with one of four 
statutorily proscribed conditions,54 “the debtor voluntarily or 
involuntarily . . . received less than a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for such transfer or obligation.”55 The look-back period is ten 
years for certain transfers made by the debtor “with actual intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud.”56 Where the beneficiary-qua-debtor has acted with 
intent to defraud or is otherwise unable to explain satisfactorily a loss of 
assets, the bankruptcy court may deny the debtor a discharge in 
bankruptcy.57 Outside of bankruptcy, a court could set aside a modification 
that would diminish or impair the vested interest of an insolvent (or soon-
to-be-insolvent) beneficiary under state-level fraudulent transfer statutes.58 
Thus, to the extent that trust term extension would interfere with pending 
or potential creditor claims, the ability to modify the trust may be severely 
constrained. 
E.  The Trustee’s Potential Conflict of Interest 
A trustee may have a conflict of interest in seeking to extend the 
duration of a trust beyond its natural termination. For example, a trustee 
receiving fees or commissions for its service during the life of the trust 
would have a financial stake in postponing the trust’s termination 
indefinitely because termination of the trust would result in cessation of the 
                                                                                                                     
§ 541, includes in the bankruptcy estate essentially all beneficial ownership interests of a debtor 
unless the interest contains ‘[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a 
trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.’” (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2)) 
(alteration in original)).  
 51. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (stating that an automatic stay precludes “any act to obtain 
possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over 
property of the estate”). 
 52. For more on spendthrift protection, see infra Subsection IV.B.1.  
 53. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). 
 54. See id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(IV).  
 55. Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i). 
 56. Id. § 548(e)(1). 
 57. Id. § 727(a)(2)–(5). 
 58. See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4–5 (1984). 
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trustee’s compensation.59 Of course, pursuit of trust term extension for the 
purpose of aggrandizing the trustee’s own personal gain would be a breach 
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty,60 so a disloyal trustee would most likely 
disguise any improper motivation with pretextual legitimate reasons for 
seeking trust term extension. This type of conflict of interest is concerning 
because corporate trustees have been known to engage in litigation to 
protect the trustee’s own fiduciary appointment and compensation, even 
where such litigation subjects the trust corpus to costs associated with the 
proceeding and fails to further either the beneficiaries’ interests or the 
settlor’s material purpose.61 
III.  TRUST TERM EXTENSION AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE 
DEVIATION 
This Part considers whether equitable deviation could be applied to 
extend the duration of a trust beyond the term imposed by the settlor or the 
perpetuities period in effect at the time of conveyance for the purpose of 
                                                                                                                     
 59. On the other hand, extension of a trust in perpetuity would also expose the trustee to 
administrative challenges and potential liability:  
Because a trustee acts at peril for mistaken distributions, the trustee must 
investigate whether a person who claims to be a beneficiary does in fact qualify. If, 
however, a trust were to have thousands or tens of thousands of potential 
beneficiaries, centuries removed from the transferor by descent, the task of 
ascertaining which persons qualify as beneficiaries would become enormously 
complex and expensive.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27, intro. note, at 558 
(2010) (footnote omitted). 
 60. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) (2010) (“A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the 
interests of the beneficiaries.”). 
 61. For example, in Davis v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n, 243 S.W.3d 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2007), the lifetime beneficiary sought removal of a corporate trustee with consent of all qualified 
beneficiaries. Id. at 426. The beneficiary sought removal because the newly proposed trustee was 
geographically closer to the beneficiaries, was more familiar with the beneficiaries’ financial 
planning objectives, and offered a lower fee schedule than the incumbent trustee. Id. at 429. 
Opposing its removal as trustee, the bank asserted a specious argument that its appointment by the 
settlor was a material purpose of the trust. Id. at 431. The court found the trustee’s assertion lacked 
“any evidentiary support” and ordered the trustee’s removal. Id. Importantly, although Davis did 
not address whether the trustee could seek reimbursement of its litigation costs from the trust assets, 
absent a court order to the contrary, reimbursement is generally permitted. For instance, § 709(a) of 
the Uniform Trust Code provides: 
A trustee is entitled to be reimbursed out of the trust property, with interest as 
appropriate, for: (1) expenses that were properly incurred in the administration of 
the trust; and (2) to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the trust, 
expenses that were not properly incurred in the administration of the trust.  
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 709(a). 
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creating new beneficial interests for future generations of the settlor’s 
descendants not named in the original instrument. Section III.A begins with 
analysis of the two relevant doctrines: equitable deviation and modification 
to achieve the settlor’s tax objectives. Section III.B considers arguments 
for and against trust term extension under those doctrines. Section III.C 
examines recent case law that applies equitable deviation with potential 
implications in the context of trust term extension. 
A.  Equitable Deviation and Modification to Achieve the Settlor’s Tax 
Objectives 
The trust law doctrine of equitable deviation permits modification of an 
administrative or distributive trust provision where circumstances 
unanticipated by the settlor arise and modification will further the trust 
purpose. Section 412(a) of the Uniform Trust Code provides: 
The court may modify the administrative or dispositive terms 
of a trust or terminate the trust if, because of circumstances 
not anticipated by the settlor, modification or termination will 
further the purposes of the trust. To the extent practicable, the 
modification must be made in accordance with the settlor’s 
probable intention.62 
Similarly, § 66 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides: 
The court may modify an administrative or distributive 
provision of a trust, or direct or permit the trustee to deviate 
from an administrative or distributive provision, if because of 
circumstances not anticipated by the settlor the modification 
or deviation will further the purposes of the trust.63 
The rationale underlying the doctrine of equitable deviation is that if the 
settlor had been aware of current circumstances, then he would have 
implemented his intent by selecting different terms.64 Courts therefore 
                                                                                                                     
 62. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a). 
 63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1), at 492 (2003). 
 64. The comments to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains the doctrine’s deference to 
the settlor’s intent: 
[A] court, in granting equitable deviation “is permitting the trustee to do not what 
the settlor intended to permit . . . but what it thinks the settlor would have 
permitted if he had known of or anticipated the circumstances that have happened. 
Even though the settlor has expressly forbidden what the court permits to be done, 
the theory is that he would not have forbidden it, but on the contrary would have 
authorized it if he had known of or anticipated the circumstances. In so doing the 
court is not interpreting the terms of the trust but is permitting a deviation from 
them in order to carry out the purpose of the trust. If it appears that the settlor did, 
however, anticipate the circumstances and clearly provided that the trustee should 
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inquire into the settlor’s intent before authorizing modification.65 
Both modern formulations of equitable deviation, as articulated in the 
Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement above, represent a liberalization 
of the doctrine from its common law origins. An older formulation of the 
doctrine imposed a higher standard, requiring the petitioner to show that 
compliance with the challenged restriction would “defeat or substantially 
impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.”66 The old 
formulation also restricted relief to modification of only an administrative 
provision.67 By contrast, under the modern rule, equitable deviation may be 
applied where “modification or deviation will further the purposes of the 
trust,”68 and the relief may include modification of an administrative or 
distributive provision.69 Additionally, the party requesting deviation need 
not obtain the beneficiaries’ consent nor prove that circumstances have 
changed since the trust’s creation.70  
For an illustration of the traditional doctrine, consider the case of 
Donnelly v. National Bank of Washington.71 In 1939, the decedent 
                                                                                                                     
nevertheless have no power to act in such a way as to prevent the failure of the 
trust, it would seem that the court would not be justified in permitting the trustee 
so to act, unless the provision is against public policy.” 
Id. § 66 cmt. a, at 499 (alteration in original) (quoting 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM 
FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 167, at 287–88 (4th ed. 1987)). 
 65. See, e.g., Smith v. Hallum, 691 S.E.2d 848, 848–50 (Ga. 2010) (denying modification 
because terminating distributions to beneficiary indicted for aggravated assault and battery would 
be inconsistent with the settlor’s intent to provide treatment for the beneficiary); In re Trust D 
Created Under the Last Will and Testament of Darby, 234 P.3d 793, 798–800 (Kan. 2010) (denying 
modification because increasing distributions to the petitioner beneficiary would be contrary to the 
settlor’s intent). 
 66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167(1), at 351 (1959). 
 67. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. a, at 498 (“The commentary to 
Restatement Second, Trusts § 167 . . . and its Illustrations, as well as the distinct weight of what 
case authority there is . . . indicate that the rule of ‘equitable deviation’ applies only to 
administrative provisions.”). 
 68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1), at 492; see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) 
(2010) (providing that equitable deviation may be applied where “modification or termination will 
further the purposes of the trust” (emphasis added)). 
 69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1), at 492; see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) 
(“The court may modify the administrative or dispositive terms of a trust.”). 
 70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. a, at 498 (“[T]he rule of the Section does not 
require changed circumstances. It is sufficient that the settlor was unaware of the circumstances in 
establishing the terms of the trust.”); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom 
of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 662 (2014) [hereinafter Sitkoff, Implementing Freedom] 
(providing that the equitable deviation doctrine is one of two recognized grounds for “judicial 
modification or termination of a trust without the settlor’s consent”). 
 71. 179 P.2d 333 (Wash. 1947). Administrative deviation is rarely invoked to modify a 
substantive provision, so it is perhaps arguable that the Donnelly court extended the doctrine of 
administrative deviation beyond the context in which it is typically applied. 
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executed a will establishing a testamentary trust for his grandson to attend 
college or graduate school with a restriction that annual distributions from 
the trust would “in no event [continue] beyond December 31, 1945.”72 At 
the time of the decedent’s death in 1940, the grandson was enrolled in a 
pre-law curriculum at the University of Washington.73 In 1942, the 
grandson graduated from college having completed one year of law school 
course work but was drafted into the U.S. Marine Corps for service in 
World War II.74 Upon discharge from active duty in 1946, the grandson 
sought to resume his law school course work and requested further 
distributions from the trust.75 The trustees, citing the 1945 termination 
date, refused to distribute additional funds.76 The grandson then filed an 
action for modification of the trust to postpone termination of the interest 
until he had completed law school.77 Applying equitable deviation, the 
court granted the requested modification: 
Clearly, it was the intention of the settlor that the specified 
amount be paid to respondent to permit him to finish his law 
course. The time limit on the payments at the time the will 
was executed gave to respondent more than enough time to 
complete his law school studies. The time was limited to 
December 31, 1945, which time limit detracts in no way from 
the settlor’s purpose toward his beneficiary. That respondent 
would be compelled to leave his studies for a period in excess 
of three years to serve in the armed forces of our country was 
not foreseen by the settlor, nor was any provision made 
therefor [sic] in the trust instrument. It is unthinkable that a 
settlor who regarded his grandson as a son would have so 
restricted the time on the education payments as to prevent the 
boy, because he was summoned from his school to the armed 
forces of our country, from completing his education. The 
only reasonable conclusion is that the settlor neither foresaw 
World War II nor anticipated that respondent would be 
required to leave his schooling unfinished and serve for more 
than three years in the armed forces of his country.78 
Donnelly presents a straightforward, sensible application of equitable 
deviation. The settlor’s original intent was to provide support for his 
grandson’s education and, perhaps, to encourage his grandson to attain that 
                                                                                                                     
 72. Id. at 333. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 334. 
 78. Id. at 336. 
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education sooner rather than later.79 But the grandson’s compulsory service 
in the military necessarily altered the timing of his education, so the 
termination provision had the unintended effect of undermining the 
settlor’s original intent. Had the settlor anticipated the beneficiary’s 
induction into the military, he most likely would have set a later 
termination date allowing the beneficiary to complete his studies.80 
Although decided under the doctrine’s old formulation that only allowed 
administrative modification, Donnelly granted modification to the trust’s 
payment instructions and, as such, appears to have anticipated the modern 
formulation’s extension of relief to distributive provisions. 
An important doctrinal corollary to equitable deviation is a related rule 
authorizing modification of a donative instrument to achieve the settlor’s 
tax objectives. Section 416 of the Uniform Trust Code provides: 
To achieve the settlor’s tax objectives, the court may modify 
the terms of a trust in a manner that is not contrary to the 
settlor’s probable intention. The court may provide that the 
modification has retroactive effect.81 
Similarly, § 12.2 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other 
Donative Transfers provides: 
A donative document may be modified, in a manner that 
does not violate the donor’s probable intention, to achieve the 
donor’s tax objectives.82 
This doctrine allows for modification when tax law governing the trust 
has changed subsequent to the conveyance, or where the instrument, as 
executed, simply fails to carry out the settlor’s probable intent with regard 
to tax objectives.83 Thus, like equitable deviation, this doctrine exists to 
implement the settlor’s probable intent.84 And like the modern formulation 
of equitable deviation, modification to achieve the settlor’s tax objectives 
may include alteration of an administrative or distributive provision.85  
                                                                                                                     
 79. Id. at 333.  
 80. Id. at 336.  
 81. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 416 (2010).  
 82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.2, at 388 
(2003). 
 83. See id. § 12.2 cmt. e, at 390 (“Although failure to achieve the donor’s tax objectives is 
often due to a change in the tax law occurring after the document was executed, this section is not 
restricted to that situation.”). 
 84. See id. § 12.2 cmt. b, at 389 (“The rationale for modifying a donative document is that the 
donor would have desired the modification to be made if he or she had realized that the desired tax 
objectives would not be achieved.”). 
 85. The Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers explains: 
[T]he modification necessary to achieve the donor’s tax objectives may require an 
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The rule permitting modification to achieve the settlor’s tax objectives 
represents a doctrinal offshoot of equitable deviation because, in its most 
typical application, the subsequent enactment of a new tax law governing 
the trust is treated as an unanticipated circumstance warranting 
modification to conform to the settlor’s original intent. Consider, for 
example, the representative case, In re Kaskel.86 In that case, the decedent 
died in 1968, leaving a will creating two trusts: a marital trust for his 
surviving spouse, and a family trust for the income benefit of his wife with 
remainder in trust for his children and grandchildren.87 The marital trust 
gave the surviving spouse a general power of appointment that, in default 
of appointment, poured into the family trust.88 The surviving spouse died 
in 1988 without exercising the power of appointment, so under the terms of 
the original instrument, the balance of the marital trust would have poured 
into the family trust.89 Both trusts became irrevocable before the effective 
date of the GST tax in 1985, so they were exempt from the tax on 
generation skipping transfers.90 However, the marital trust’s pour-over 
provision would have caused the family trust to lose its GST tax-exempt 
status.91 The trustees petitioned the court to modify the marital trust in two 
respects: first, to create separate trusts for the decedent’s children to avoid 
distribution to the family trust; and second, to fund the newly created trusts 
in a manner that took advantage of the surviving spouse’s GST exemption 
amount of $1 million.92 Observing that the original instrument “resulted in 
unforeseen GST tax consequences,” the court granted the requested 
modification.93 Extrapolating from the decedent’s use of planning 
                                                                                                                     
alteration of beneficial interests. Such an alteration is acceptable so long as it does 
not violate the donor’s probable intention. In determining the donor’s probable 
intention, the donor’s non-tax as well as tax objectives are to be considered. The 
greater the proposed alteration, the more rigorous the court should be in measuring 
the requested modification against the donor’s probable intention. One measure of 
the donor’s probable intention is the donor’s general dispositive plan. Even if it is 
questionable whether the modification would be consistent with the donor’s 
general dispositive plan, however, the court can still find that it does not violate 
the donor’s probable intention if the detrimentally affected beneficiaries consent to 
the proposed modification. Such consent makes it more likely that the donor 
would have approved of the modification, whether or not the modification alters 
the donor’s general dispositive plan. 
Id. § 12.2 cmt. f, at 390. 
 86. 549 N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1989). 
 87. Id. at 588.  
 88. Id.   
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 589. 
 93. Id. at 588. 
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techniques to minimize estate taxes, the court found that one of the 
decedent’s overall objectives in creating the trust was to minimize federal 
transfer taxes.94 The court concluded: “It is therefore clear that if some 
form of GST tax was in place in 1968, [the decedent] would have taken 
advantage of any exemption or benefit that was available to him by law.”95  
Thus, the doctrine can operate by treating a subsequent enactment of 
new tax law governing the trust—in In re Kaskel, the GST tax—as an 
unanticipated circumstance justifying modification of the original 
instrument to conform to the settlor’s intent.96 
B.  Arguments For and Against Trust Term Extension Under 
the Trust Modification Doctrines 
Proponents of trust term extension are likely to assert some of the 
following arguments: First, that under the doctrine of equitable deviation, 
modification should be granted where the settlor intended to create a 
perpetual trust but failed to consider the possibility that the Rule Against 
Perpetuities would be repealed or abrogated and this constitutes an 
unanticipated circumstance that allows for such modification.97 Because no 
aspect of the equitable deviation doctrine expressly precludes adding new 
beneficiaries, the doctrine is sufficiently flexible to allow for this type of 
modification so long as the result is consistent with the settlor’s probable 
intent. 
Second, the related doctrine authorizing modification to achieve the 
settlor’s tax objectives supports the case for trust term extension by 
recognizing that a subsequent change in the law governing the trust can 
form the basis for a modification designed to take advantage of the new tax 
law. Further, if a settlor’s tax objectives included sheltering the trust 
assets from transfer taxation in perpetuity, then extending the duration 
of the trust in perpetuity arguably reflects a tax objective rather than 
merely a distributive preference. The doctrine permitting modification 
to achieve the settlor’s tax objectives does not require a showing of 
unanticipated circumstances and, unlike equitable deviation, does not 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Id. at 590. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Courts have also found that case law decided after the original conveyance may constitute 
an unanticipated circumstance warranting equitable deviation. See In re Harris Testamentary Trust, 
69 P.3d 1109, 1118 (Kan. 2003) (“The holding in Jackson could not have been anticipated by 
Harris, and the change furthers the purposes of the Trust. The change granted is consistent with 
Harris’ probable and actual intent.”). 
 97. Or, alternatively, the petitioner might argue that the settlor’s failure to consider the 
possibility that another jurisdiction might repeal or abrogate the Rule constitutes an unanticipated 
circumstance warranting modification of the trust’s situs and governing law to relocate the trust 
within a jurisdiction that has repealed the Rule. 
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limit its relief to modification of an administrative or distributive 
provision. 98 
Third, although a private donative trust must generally identify 
ascertainable beneficiaries, a jurisdiction permitting retroactive application 
of the Rule’s repeal has, in effect, nullified the trust law requirement of an 
ascertainable beneficiary.99 The Uniform Trust Code requires that a trust 
have a “definite beneficiary,” but the Code’s requirement incorporates by 
reference the Rule Against Perpetuities: “A beneficiary is definite if the 
beneficiary can be ascertained now or in the future, subject to any 
applicable rule against perpetuities.”100 Thus, abrogation or repeal of the 
Rule Against Perpetuities would seem to abrogate or repeal the trust law 
requirement of an ascertainable beneficiary as well. For example, in a 
jurisdiction that has adopted this provision of the Uniform Trust Code and 
repealed or abrogated the Rule Against Perpetuities, an unborn descendant 
of the settlor eligible to take 200 years from the date of conveyance could 
be ascertained in the future even if he could not be identified today. If such 
a beneficiary would satisfy the trust law requirement of an ascertainable 
beneficiary, then the trust should be susceptible to modification that would 
render him a permissible beneficiary. 
Fourth, the law should not discriminate against a settlor who intended 
(explicitly or implicitly) to create a perpetual trust, but by accident of 
history, created an irrevocable trust before the governing jurisdiction 
repealed its Rule Against Perpetuities. And fifth, a jurisdiction’s repeal of 
the Rule Against Perpetuities signifies public policy favoring perpetual 
trusts,101 so trust law should follow suit by facilitating the conversion of 
existing trusts into perpetual trusts. 
Opponents of trust term extension will likely assert the following 
counterarguments: First, and perhaps most compellingly, that the 
consequences of trust term extension in this context would impair existing 
beneficial interests by converting remainders into lifetime interests in order 
to add new generations of the settlor’s issue as permissible beneficiaries; 
trust term extensions would force residuary beneficiaries who would have 
received an outright distribution under the original instrument to accept a 
                                                                                                                     
 98. The tax objective modification doctrine provides, “[t]o achieve the settlor’s tax 
objectives, the court may modify the terms of a trust in a manner that is not contrary to the settlor’s 
probable intention. The court may provide that the modification has retroactive effect.” UNIF. TRUST 
CODE § 416 (2010). 
 99. See, e.g., id. § 402, at 59; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 44, at 195 (2003).  
 100. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402. 
 101. Lee-Ford Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2579, 2639 (2011) (noting that “there is a growing trend in the United States of 
abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities,” and this abolition tends to “demonstrate a strong public 
policy of favoring donative freedom”).  
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less valuable lifetime interest under the modified trust.102 Further, 
modification impairing the interests of existing beneficiaries runs contrary 
to a core function of trust law: to benefit the beneficiaries identified by the 
settlor.103 For example, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts takes the position 
that “it is appropriate that courts act with particular caution in considering 
a modification or deviation that can be expected to diminish the interest(s) 
of one or more of the beneficiaries in favor of one or more others.”104 
Applying that rationale, courts have declined to grant equitable deviation, 
absent unanimous consent, where the proposed modification would 
augment the interests of some beneficiaries at the cost of diminishing the 
interests of other beneficiaries identified in the trust instrument.105 If 
equitable deviation cannot be applied to redistribute or reallocate interests 
among existing beneficiaries, then, a fortiori, the doctrine should not be 
applied to create new interests for individuals not identified in the trust 
instrument at the cost of impairing existing beneficial interests.106 
                                                                                                                     
 102. Opposition to trust term extension would, perhaps, be less vociferous in cases where no 
living beneficiary is divested of a remainder interest. For example, in a trust where the remainder is 
to be distributed to A’s children, a trustee might seek to extend the trust’s duration before A has 
children. In this situation, no living beneficiary would be divested because the remainder 
beneficiaries have yet to come into existence. 
 103. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 (“A trust and its terms must be for the benefit of its 
beneficiaries.”). 
 104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. b, at 493–94. 
 105. See, e.g., Friedman v. Teplis, 492 S.E.2d 885, 887 (Ga. 1997) (denying modification that 
would have avoided unforeseen adverse tax consequences where the guardian ad litem appointed to 
represent the settlor’s unborn children failed to prove the proposed modification would have 
protected the settlor’s children’s beneficial interest); Nobbe v. Nobbe (In re Trust Under the Last 
Will and Testament of Nobbe), 831 N.E.2d 835, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (denying equitable 
deviation where the proposed modification represented “an attempt to equalize the devises” among 
all of the beneficiaries absent language in the trust authorizing redistribution); In re Trust D Created 
Under the Last Will and Testament of Darby, 234 P.3d 793, 801 (Kan. 2010) (“We conclude that 
funding an increase [for the first generation of beneficiaries] will inherently frustrate [the settlor’s] 
intention for this growth, as well as jeopardize—or at least reduce—distributions to the second and 
third generation of beneficiaries.”); In re Estate of Branigan, 609 A.2d 431, 438 (N.J. 1992) 
(“Under that proposed [modification], the interests of the grandchildren whose fathers were living 
at the time of decedent’s death could be affected by making their father’s power of appointment 
general with the possibility they could lose their inheritance.”). 
 106. Two analogous provisions concerning powers of appointment are in accord. The draft of 
§ 305(c)(3) of the Uniform Powers of Appointment Act provides, “[u]nless the terms of the 
instrument creating the power of appointment manifest a contrary intent, the powerholder of a 
nongeneral power may . . . create a nongeneral power in any person to appoint to one or more of the 
permissible appointees of the original nongeneral power.” UNIF. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT ACT 
§ 305(c)(3) (Proposed Draft 2013). Thus, it follows that if the holder of a nongeneral power of 
appointment cannot create a second power whose objects exceed the objects of the first power, 
then the nongeneral power cannot be exercised in favor of an appointee not identified in the initial 
appointment. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 19.14, 
at 307 (2010) (“Except to the extent that the donor has manifested a contrary intention, the donee of 
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Second, equitable deviation exists to implement the settlor’s intent as it 
existed at the time of conveyance.107 While the settlor might have 
reconsidered the purpose, duration, and objects of the trust in light of 
subsequent changes to the Rule Against Perpetuities if given the 
opportunity, equitable deviation does not authorize a court to entertain a 
reconsideration of the settlor’s original intent.108 Likewise, evidence of 
objectives or intentions the settlor considered prior to conveyance, but 
absent from the finally executed instrument, should not form the basis for 
modification that would give effect to preliminary considerations that the 
settlor ultimately rejected. 
Third, modifying a trust to create new beneficial interests for future 
generations of the settlor’s descendants undermines the trust law 
requirement of a definite, ascertainable beneficiary.109 The requirement that 
a trust have ascertainable beneficiaries implicates core functions of trust 
law—the placing of responsibility on the trustee to protect the interests of 
known beneficiaries and the right of beneficiaries to enforce the duties of 
trusteeship.110 Abrogating the ascertainable beneficiary requirement in this 
context would appear to have the effect of undermining the duties of 
trusteeship while extending the trustee’s compensation. Unborn, 
unascertainable beneficiaries require less of the trustee’s attention and are 
not likely to sue the current trustee for breach of fiduciary duties, so the 
current trustee would be at least partially insulated from both the 
obligations and liabilities of trusteeship. Meanwhile, the existence of 
unascertainable future beneficiaries would require the trustee’s continued 
service after the trust’s original point of termination, so the trustee, if 
compensated, would receive fees that would not have accrued under the 
original trust. For these reasons and others, perhaps trust law should revise 
                                                                                                                     
a nongeneral power is authorized to make an appointment in any form, including one in trust and 
one that creates a power of appointment in another, that only benefits permissible appointees of the 
power.”). 
 107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. a, at 493 (“The objective is to give effect 
to what the settlor’s intent probably would have been had the circumstances in question been 
anticipated.”).  
 108. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412 cmt. (“The purpose of the ‘equitable deviation’ authorized by 
subsection (a) is not to disregard the settlor’s intent but to modify inopportune details to effectuate 
better the settlor’s broader purposes.”). 
 109. See Sitkoff, The Lurking Rule, supra note 20, at 506 n.32 (noting the argument that trusts 
might still be invalidated for want of an ascertainable beneficiary in states that have abolished the 
Rule Against Perpetuities). A valid trust generally requires a definite beneficiary. See, e.g., UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 402. Under the Uniform Trust Code, a trust for a noncharitable purpose may have 
unascertainable beneficiaries, but its duration cannot last for more than twenty-one years. Id. § 409, 
at 67–68. 
 110. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 46 reporter’s notes cmt. b, at 212 (“The 
beneficiaries’ rights to enforce the trust and make the trustees account for their conduct with the 
correlative duties of the trustees to the beneficiaries are at the core of the trust.”). 
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the ascertainable beneficiary requirement without regard or reference to the 
Rule Against Perpetuities.  
Fourth, applying equitable deviation in this context would present a 
significant risk of misinterpreting the settlor’s intent, particularly in cases 
where the settlor is deceased or incapacitated.111 This is, in part, because 
the petitioner seeking modification has the upper hand in proceedings for 
equitable deviation, in which the ultimate burden of persuasion rests on the 
party opposing modification to prove the settlor anticipated the 
circumstance in question.112 Inquiry into the settlor’s intent is also, by 
nature, “likely to involve a somewhat subjective process of attempting to 
infer the relevant purpose or purposes of a trust from the general tenor of 
its provisions and from the nature of the beneficial interests, together with 
the family or personal relationships involved in the trust.”113 After the 
settlor’s death or incapacitation, evidence of donative intent is often 
difficult to ascertain because the settlor is no longer available to testify or 
object.114 But as difficult as it may be to posthumously obtain evidence of 
                                                                                                                     
 111. Cf. Tate, supra note 7, at 623 (arguing that while easy modification and termination of 
trusts may give beneficiaries the authority to “act on their superior information,” such modification 
and termination may also involve value judgments that may “allow the beneficiaries, at each 
generation, to substitute their own values for those of the settlor” (emphasis added)).  
 112. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains the procedure for a petition for equitable 
deviation: 
Upon a showing of changed circumstances, or a petitioner’s credible 
presentation that relevant circumstances were unknown to the settlor, the burden 
of persuasion shifts to the person(s) seeking to show that the circumstances were 
anticipated by the settlor during the formulation and execution of the trust. Failure 
to provide in the terms of trust for subsequent developments involved in a case 
reinforces an inference that the circumstances were not anticipated by the settlor. 
Then, upon a finding of unanticipated circumstances, the court must further 
determine whether a proposed or contemplated modification or deviation would 
tend to advance (or, instead, possibly detract from) the trust purposes. This latter 
inquiry is likely to involve a somewhat subjective process of attempting to infer 
the relevant purpose or purposes of a trust from the general tenor of its provisions 
and from the nature of the beneficial interests, together with the family or personal 
relationships involved in the trust. In this process, it is appropriate that courts act 
with particular caution in considering a modification or deviation that can be 
expected to diminish the interest(s) of one or more of the beneficiaries in favor of 
one or more others. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. b, at 493–94. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Professor Robert Sitkoff has explained this evidentiary problem in the context of 
testamentary dispositions made by will:  
A will is a peculiar legal instrument, however, in that it does not take effect until 
after the testator dies. As a consequence, probate courts follow what has been 
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the settlor’s intent, it is likely even more difficult to posthumously obtain 
evidence of what the settlor did not intend, particularly in the face of 
circumstances unanticipated by the settlor. A subjective inquiry based on 
what may often be unreliable, one-sided evidence of the settlor’s intent is 
likely to create a dynamic in which the party bearing the lower burden of 
persuasion—the petitioner seeking modification—will dominate the 
equitable deviation proceeding. A court may not require much evidence at 
all to adduce the settlor’s intent to establish a perpetual trust. This, in turn, 
suggests that the grant of modification may tend to have the effect of 
implementing the petitioner’s objectives rather than the settlor’s probable 
intent. Where unanticipated circumstances do not impede the 
administration of the original trust instrument executed by the settlor, it 
would seem unnecessary to expose the trust or its beneficiaries to the 
possibility of modification that would misinterpret the settlor’s intent.  
On balance, the arguments against trust term extension would seem to 
greatly outweigh those in favor. Although it may be true that the public 
policy of some jurisdictions now favors the creation of perpetual trusts, it 
does not necessarily follow that such policy would endorse modification of 
an existing trust and the resulting impairment of incumbent beneficial 
interests. There is no evidence that the drafting committees of the Uniform 
Trust Code or the Restatement (Third) of Trusts ever contemplated the 
remote possibility that a trust could be amended or extended in perpetuity, 
with the effect of adding new beneficiaries to the trust. If they were to 
contemplate the question today, however, it is likely they would reject the 
idea wholesale. Impairment of existing beneficial interests in this context 
would be manifestly inconsistent with provisions of trust law that protect 
existing beneficiaries of irrevocably settled trusts. Posthumous inquiry into 
the settlor’s intent presents a significant risk of inaccurate factual findings 
and the consequences of those inaccuracies could adversely affect existing 
beneficiaries. Although the failure to modify a trust to extend its duration 
and expand its pool of beneficiaries may also pose a risk of deviating from 
the settlor’s probable intent in light of the Rule Against Perpetuities’ 
repeal, the adverse consequences of that risk would not divest any living 
individual of an existing property interest in the trust. The benefits of 
implementing the settlor’s probable intent would therefore seem strongly 
outweighed by the costs of impairing the beneficiaries’ actual property 
interest in the trust. 
                                                                                                                     
called a “worst evidence” rule of procedure. The witness who is best able 
to . . . clarify the meaning of its terms is dead by the time the court considers such 
issues.  
Sitkoff, Implementing Freedom, supra note 70, at 647 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted).  
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C.  Insights from Case Law 
To date, no reported judicial decision has applied, or refused to apply, 
equitable deviation to extend the term of a trust on grounds that the settlor 
failed to anticipate repeal or abrogation of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
This Section will therefore consider two recently reported opinions 
addressing trust term extension outside of the perpetuities context, In re 
Riddell115 and In re Stephen L. Chapman Irrevocable Trust Agreement (In 
re Chapman).116 Both cases offer insight into how courts and litigants 
might analyze trust term extension within the perpetuities context. 
In In re Riddell, husband-and-wife settlors created testamentary trusts 
for the lifetime benefit of their only son and daughter-in-law, and upon 
their death, for the benefit of the settlors’ two grandchildren with an 
outright distribution of principal when the grandchildren reached the age of 
thirty-five.117 Both grandchildren turned thirty-five while the son and 
daughter-in-law were still alive.118 After the trusts’ creation, the settlors’ 
granddaughter Nancy was diagnosed with a serious mental illness and 
received inpatient treatment at a state hospital.119 The settlor’s son, as 
trustee, foresaw the adverse consequences that would arise if Nancy were 
to receive an outright distribution of principal and petitioned for equitable 
deviation to distribute her interest into a special needs trust:120 
[The trustee] argued that a special needs trust is necessary 
because, upon distribution, Nancy’s trust funds would either 
be seized by the State of Washington to pay her extraordinary 
medical bills or Nancy would manage the funds poorly due to 
her mental illness and lack of judgment. [The trustee] argued 
that the modification would preserve and properly manage 
Nancy’s funds for her benefit.121 
The Washington Court of Appeals held that the creation of a special 
needs trust for this purpose would not violate public policy with regard to 
the treatment of property interests of persons receiving public assistance 
and granted the requested modification. Further, in regard to the settlors’ 
intent the court reasoned that: 
There is no question that changed circumstances have 
intervened to frustrate the settlors’ intent. [The settlors] 
                                                                                                                     
 115. 157 P.3d 888 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).  
 116. Chapman v. Chapman (In re Stephen L. Chapman Irrevocable Trust), 953 N.E.2d 573 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011).  
 117. In re Riddell, 157 P.3d at 889–90. 
 118. Id. at 890.   
 119. Id.  
 120. See id. 
 121. Id. 
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intended that she have the funds to use as she saw fit. Not 
only is Nancy unable to manage the funds or to pass them to 
her son, but there is a great likelihood that the funds will be 
lost to the State for her medical care. It is clear that the 
settlors would have wanted a different result.122 
In re Riddell is noteworthy because it applied equitable deviation in a 
manner that impaired an existing, vested beneficial interest while, at the 
same time, it rendered the modified trust more useful to the beneficiary. By 
postponing outright distribution to Nancy, the modification made the trust 
corpus less available than under the instruments’ original terms.123 But the 
creation of a special needs trust allowed Nancy to retain her beneficial 
interest without jeopardizing her eligibility for public assistance.124 
Proponents of trust term extension may cite In re Riddell for the 
proposition that equitable deviation can be applied to increase the duration 
of a trust beyond its natural termination notwithstanding impairment of an 
existing, vested beneficial interest. Proponents may also point out the 
implications of In re Riddell on remand. The remand proceedings for the 
case were not reported, but the trial court could have modified the trust in 
one of two ways to comply with the appellate court’s mandate.125 The first 
option would have created a special needs trust for the duration of Nancy’s 
life and distributed the remainder outright to Nancy’s estate upon her 
death. The second option would have created a special needs trust for the 
duration of Nancy’s life and distributed the remainder to Nancy’s children 
outright upon her death. Significantly, for purposes of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities analysis most relevant to this Article, the second option would 
have designated a new generation of the settlors’ descendants, their great-
grandchildren, as permissible beneficiaries of the trust. 
If the trial court had ordered the latter modification on remand, then the 
grant of equitable deviation could have, in theory, enabled the trustee to 
take advantage of the State of Washington’s abrogation of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. In 2002, Washington abrogated its Rule, with respect to 
property interests held in trust, by extending the perpetuities period to 150 
                                                                                                                     
 122. Id. at 892. 
 123. Id. at 890–91.  
 124. The In re Riddell court further noted that, as authorized by the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2012), “[a] supplemental needs trust is a 
trust that is established for the disabled person’s benefit and that is intended to supplement public 
benefits without increasing countable assets and resources so as to disqualify the individual from 
public benefits.” In re Riddell, 157 P.3d at 892. 
 125. On remand, the trial court was ordered to “reconsider this matter and to order such 
equitable deviation as is consistent with the settlors’ intent in light of changed circumstances.” Id. at 
893. 
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years.126 The amended Rule applies to irrevocable trusts with an effective 
date of January 1, 2002, or later,127 and the In re Riddell trusts were 
presumably created long before the 2002 statutory enactment.128 Thus, 
proponents of trust term extension might cite In re Riddell as support for 
the proposition that equitable deviation can be applied to extend the term 
of a trust beyond the perpetuities period in effect at the time of conveyance.  
While arguably creative, this interpretation of In re Riddell would strain 
credulity because the appellate court’s opinion did not address the 
perpetuities aspect of the trust term extension issue, and the remand order 
                                                                                                                     
 126. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.130 (2014) (“No provision of an instrument creating a trust, 
including the provisions of any further trust created, and no other disposition of property made 
pursuant to exercise of a power of appointment granted in or created through authority under such 
instrument is invalid under the rule against perpetuities, or any similar statute or common law, 
during the one hundred fifty years following the effective date of the instrument. Thereafter, unless 
the trust assets have previously become distributable or vested, the provision or other disposition of 
property is deemed to have been rendered invalid under the rule against perpetuities.”).  The prior 
statutory Rule in Washington provided, in part:  
If any provision of an instrument creating a trust, including the provisions 
of any further trust created, or any other disposition of property made pursuant 
to exercise of a power of appointment granted in or created through authority 
under such instrument violates the rule against perpetuities, neither such 
provision nor any other provisions of the trust, or such further trust or other 
disposition, is thereby rendered invalid during any of the following periods: (1) 
The twenty-one years following the effective date of the instrument; (2) The 
period measured by any life or lives in being or conceived at the effective date 
of the instrument if by the terms of the instrument the trust is to continue for 
such life or lives; (3) The period measured by any portion of any life or lives in 
being or conceived at the effective date of the instrument if by the terms of the 
instrument the trust is to continue for such portion of such life or lives; and (4) 
The twenty-one years following the expiration of the periods specified in (2) 
and (3) above.  
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.130 (2001) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.130 (2014)). 
 127. The amended Rule added a section stating that:  
This act applies to any irrevocable trust with an effective date on or after 
January 1, 2002. Unless the trust instrument otherwise provides, this act does 
not apply to: (1) Any irrevocable trust with an effective date prior to January 1, 
2002; or (2) a revocable inter vivos trust or testamentary trust with an effective 
date on or after January 1, 2002, if at all times after the date of enactment the 
creator of the revocable inter vivos trust or testamentary trust was not 
competent to revoke, amend, or modify the instrument. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.130 (2001) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.130 (2014)). 
 128. Although the effective dates of the In re Riddell trusts were not disclosed in the court’s 
opinion, the case facts imply that a long period of time had elapsed between the trusts’ creation and 
the court’s adjudication in 2007. Nancy received “extensive outpatient care” for her illness as early 
as 1991. In re Riddell, 157 P.3d at 890. 
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did not expressly require a modification that would extend the trust to the 
next generation of the settlors’ descendants. Further, since Washington’s 
pre-2002 Rule incorporated the Uniform Statutory Rule Against 
Perpetuities’ “wait-and-see” approach,129 the modified trust would likely 
have complied with the perpetuities period in effect when the trust was 
created. The remand proceedings were not reported, and it is entirely 
possible—indeed, likely—that the final modification ordered by the trial 
court altered the trust without extending the duration beyond the pre-2002 
perpetuities period. Thus, opponents of trust term extension would seem to 
have the more persuasive reading of In re Riddell with regard to the 
perpetuities question.130 
Another case that helps illustrate issues related to trust term extension is 
In re Chapman. In In re Chapman, husband-and-wife settlors, Howard and 
Elizabeth, created an inter vivos irrevocable trust for the benefit of their 
son, Stephen, and appointed themselves as trustees.131 The trust provided 
that Stephen would receive a distribution on his fifty-fifth birthday.132 On 
the date of the trust conveyance, Stephen (likely forty-three years old at the 
time) was engaged to his fiancée, Carrie, and they married about one 
month later.133 After eleven and a half years of marriage, however, Carrie 
filed for divorce.134 Howard and Elizabeth, as trustees, filed a petition for 
equitable deviation seeking to postpone the date of distribution until after 
the final decree in Stephen’s divorce proceeding.135 Carrie intervened as a 
party with a special interest and opposed the modification. She argued that 
the distribution should proceed as directed by the original trust instrument 
on Stephen’s fifty-fifth birthday and that, upon distribution, the distributed 
funds should be treated as marital assets for purposes of the divorce 
proceeding.136  
                                                                                                                     
 129. See, e.g., Keith L. Butler, Note, Long Live the Dead Hand: A Case for Repeal of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities in Washington, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1237, 1249 (2000) (“Washington’s waiting 
period is set at beneficiaries’ lives-in-being plus twenty-one years. Trust interests that vest before 
the end of this perpetuities period are distributed to the beneficiaries, even if there had been some 
remote possibility that the interests could have vested later.” (footnote omitted)); see also Statutory 
Rule Against Perpetuities Summary, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.
aspx?title=Statutory+Rule+Against+Perpetuities (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
 130. Although not related to the perpetuities issue, at least one court in another jurisdiction 
declined to follow In re Riddell on grounds that state public policy precluded insulating the 
beneficial interest of a trust where the beneficiary seeks public assistance. See In re Ruby G. Owen 
Trust ex rel. Owen, 418 S.W.3d 421, 423–25 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012). 
 131. Chapman v. Chapman (In re Chapman), 953 N.E.2d 573, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 
 132. Id. The initial corpus consisted of stock in a mortgage company founded by Elizabeth’s 
father, but the stock was later sold and replaced with other assets. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. See id. at 575–76.  
 136. Id. at 576.  
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The trustees claimed that the original instrument contained its own 
equitable deviation provision, expressly providing for the possibility of 
unforeseen circumstances and authorizing modification when necessary.137 
The trust provided as follows: 
The Settlors recognize that one or both of the following 
unforeseeable conditions may arise in the future: 
(a) Legislation or court decisions highly detrimental to any 
trust created hereunder or to any beneficiary; or 
(b) Other events tending to greatly impair the intent and 
purposes of the Irrevocable Trust Agreement. 
Should either of these conditions occur, reformation or 
termination of the trust created hereunder might be desirable. 
The Trustee, in the sole judgment and discretion of the 
Trustee, may petition the court of competent jurisdiction for a 
determination that a condition coming within either of the 
foregoing standards has occurred, and that the best interests of 
the trust and of the beneficiaries require reformation or 
termination of the trust.138 
Carrie argued that divorce was not an unanticipated circumstance.139 
She then pointed to language in the trust providing for the contingency of a 
pending divorce proceeding at the time of Stephen’s death and argued that 
no such provision addressed that contingency other than at Stephen’s 
death.140 Carrie claimed that the trust’s mention of divorce demonstrated 
that the settlors had anticipated the possibility.141 
At a hearing on the trustees’ petition to reform the trust, “Howard 
testified that the purpose of the Trust was to pass the property that had 
been inherited by Elizabeth and accumulated for generations to 
Stephen.”142 Crediting Howard’s testimony, the court of appeals noted the 
lower court’s findings: 
The trial court found that “[t]he intent of the Chapmans as the 
Settlors of the trust was to pass the assets received by 
Elizabeth Chapman from her parents on to her son, his family 
and his issue.” The trial court determined that “the pending 
[marital] dissolution . . . is an event tending to greatly impair 
the intent and purposes of the [Trust] and that it is in the best 
                                                                                                                     
 137. Id. at 575–76.  
 138. Id. at 579. 
 139. See id. at 582.  
 140. Id.  
 141. See id.  
 142. Id. at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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interest of the [T]rust and the Beneficiary that [the Trust 
provisions] be reformed.”143  
Applying equitable deviation, the trial court below modified the trust 
“so that any interest of Stephen L. Chapman in the Trust shall not vest 
prior to six months after the entry of the final dissolution decree dissolving 
the marriage of Carrie A. Chapman and Stephen L. Chapman and 
disposing of the marital property.”144 
Yet the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed.145 Setting a high standard 
for equitable deviation, the court cited approvingly authorities requiring 
“truly unforeseen” circumstances as a necessary condition for 
modification.146 Under that standard, the court found equitable deviation 
inapplicable because the trust itself contained language anticipating 
Stephen’s divorce—the “unforeseen” circumstances offered as grounds for 
modification.147 Under the court’s interpretation of the trust, the settlors 
foresaw the possibility that Stephen’s marriage might dissolve and 
provided for that contingency if Stephen died during the divorce 
proceeding but not if he survived it.148 According to the court, that was 
enough to demonstrate that the settlors anticipated the possibility of 
divorce and, therefore, it was not an unforeseen circumstance to allow for a 
modification of the trust.149 
Particularly striking here is the court’s refusal to apply equitable 
deviation where the settlor himself testified about his intent with regard to 
the trust’s purpose and the proposed modification. Unlike testamentary 
trust cases where the parties struggle to adduce evidence of a deceased 
settlor’s probable intent, In re Chapman involved an inter vivos 
irrevocable trust and the trial court record contained evidence of the 
settlor’s actual intent.150 But the court did not base its reversal on a 
credibility determination of settlor’s testimony regarding the trust’s 
purpose.151 Rather, the court ascertained the settlor’s intent and ex ante 
                                                                                                                     
 143. Id. at 577 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 575, 582.  
 146. Id. at 581. 
 147. Id. at 582 (“[I]n Clause 5 the Trust mentions the possibility of a pending dissolution and 
directs that Carrie’s contingent interest lapses if she and Stephen are not married or a dissolution is 
pending at the time of his death. This illustrates that Trustees, as then-Settlors, anticipated the 
possibility of a pending dissolution at the time of Stephen’s death.”). 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 576.  
 151. Id. at 583 n.6 (“Because we find determinative our holding concerning the requirement 
that events be ‘unforeseen,’ and the trial court’s decision to the contrary requires reversal, we do not 
reach the trial court’s findings and conclusions concerning the Trust’s purpose and whether the 
modification was in Stephen’s best interests.”). 
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consideration of Stephen’s potential divorce from the four corners of the 
original instrument.152  
At trial, Howard, one of the settlors, testified that “[t]he only 
way . . . that [Carrie] could ever become a beneficiary would be if Steve 
had died during the term of the trust and there were [sic] no divorce 
pending.”153 Although Howard’s statement reflected his clear intent at the 
time of trial to prevent Carrie from sharing in Stephen’s interest in the 
trust, that intent may not have been a trust purpose at the time of 
conveyance.154 Howard must have realized that, as of Stephen’s fifty-fifth 
birthday, Carrie was effectively a creditor of Stephen, so in hindsight it was 
a mistake to have required a mandatory distribution without asset 
protection features preventing creditors from reaching the trust property.155 
The trial court found Howard credible and, under the applicable standard 
of review, factual findings, including determinations about witness 
credibility, are reversed only if clearly erroneous.156 Here, the appellate 
court’s opinion contains language implying that it did not believe 
Howard’s trial testimony because he may have changed his mind about the 
trust’s purposes after the irrevocable conveyance.157 Thus, had the 
applicable standard of review not required deference to the trial court’s 
factual findings, the appellate court most likely would have found that the 
settlor’s testimony reflected a reconsideration of the trust’s objectives 
rather than the settlors’ original intent at the time of conveyance.  
Under a broader reading of the case, In re Chapman offers insight into 
the relevant inquiry regarding the settlor’s intent. It suggests that only the 
settlor’s original intent should be applied to determine whether the trust’s 
terms should be modified in light of unanticipated circumstances. 
Equitable deviation authorizes a court to modify the trust’s terms but does 
not permit reconsideration of the settlor’s original intent, whether by the 
court or the settlor himself. Opponents of trust term extension may cite In 
                                                                                                                     
 152. See id. at 583 (interpreting the terms of the trust in order to conclude that the settlor 
anticipated the possibility of a pending dissolution of marriage at the time of the beneficiary’s 
death).  
 153. Id. at 576 (alterations in original). 
 154. Contrary to Howard’s characterization, Carrie did not assert a beneficial interest in the 
trust. Rather, she claimed that trust property distributed to Stephen on his fifty-fifth birthday would 
become marital property for purposes of the divorce proceeding after its distribution from the trust. 
Id. 
 155. Some asset protection features, such as spendthrift protection, would not have prevented a 
former spouse from reaching the beneficiary’s interest in the trust. See infra Subection IV.B.1.  
 156. In re Chapman, 953 N.E.2d at 578–79 (citing Tew v. Tew, 924 N.E.2d 1262, 1264–65 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). 
 157. Id. at 582 (“[B]y their very nature, irrevocable trusts carry risks that relationships and 
values and circumstances may change after the date the Trust is funded, and those risks must be 
evaluated against the tax and other benefits received by the settlor(s).”). 
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re Chapman for the proposition that the settlor’s probable intent must 
relate back to the time of conveyance and that courts should not authorize 
modification where the settlor might have chosen a different trust purpose, 
even in light of unanticipated circumstances. 
IV.  THE LARGER CONTEXT: PERPETUITIES AND TRUST LAW REFORM 
This Part considers the issue of trust term extension within the larger 
context of legal reform affecting dead hand control of property. In recent 
years, trust law and the legal regime governing wealth transfers have been 
pulled in opposing directions. Perpetuities reform, in the form of 
widespread repeal and abrogation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, has 
moved in the direction of strengthening dead hand control while reforms in 
the broader law of trusts have staged a measured retreat away from dead 
hand control. This policy schism can be explained, at least partly, by the 
divergent views of stakeholders lobbying for reform. Academic legal 
scholars and members of the American Law Institute are, by and large, 
disinterested stakeholders with no financial stake in the outcome of legal 
reform. They tend to argue against perpetual dead hand control because 
inflexible restrictions lead to disagreement when circumstances inevitably 
change with the passage of time and concentrations of wealth often 
associated with dead hand control exacerbate wealth and income 
inequality.158 The financial services industry, with a strong pecuniary interest 
in perpetuities reform, tends to favor expansion of dead hand control because 
the increased use of trusts, both in quantity and duration, generates a 
corresponding increase in revenues obtained from establishment and 
administration of those trusts.159 This Part will place the issue of trust term 
extension within the framework of these diverging trends of legal reform. 
                                                                                                                     
 158. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 27 
reporter’s note, at 564–66 (2011) (noting that the American Law Institute’s position is that the 
recent statutory trend of abrogating the Rule is “ill advised” and that “[a]n important reason for 
maintaining a reasonable limit on dead-hand control is that the limit forces control of encumbered 
property to be shifted periodically to the living, free of restrictions imposed by the original 
transferor”); see also Susan F. French, Perpetual Trusts, Conservation Servitudes, and the Problem 
of the Future, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 2526 (2006) (arguing that perpetual trusts, if successful, 
“will probably exacerbate class divisions between the wealthy and the rest of Americans”); cf. 
Shepard, supra note 1, at 561 (discussing various arguments for and against the Rule Against 
Perpetuities); Tate, supra note 7, at 597 n.9 (noting that “law professors tend to regard issues of 
dead-hand control as important”).  
 159. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against 
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2098, 2101–03 (2003) (describing 
competition among states to attract banks and trust companies through abolishment of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities); cf. Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1335 (2003) (“There is an old saw in the banking business: ‘How do you 
make a small fortune? Give a bank a large one to manage in trust.’”). 
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A.  Perpetuities Reform: The Rise of Dead Hand Control 
Over the last few decades, reform in the law governing private 
perpetual trusts has facilitated the rise of dead hand control by dramatically 
scaling back limitations imposed by the Rule Against Perpetuities.160 The 
vast majority of American jurisdictions had at one point adopted the 
Rule—or some form of limitation on perpetual restrictions on property—
but a recent wave of state law reform has effected a broad reversal of 
policy such that today, most states permit the exercise of dead hand control 
for hundreds of years or in perpetuity through “dynasty trusts” as they are 
known within the bar.161 This reform was driven, for the most part, by the 
desire of state legislatures to attract out-of-state trust business and the 
perceived economic benefits associated with locating the trustee’s situs 
within the state’s jurisdiction.162 In a groundbreaking and influential 
                                                                                                                     
 160. See Harding, supra note 15, at 297–98.  
 161. See id. at 295–97; MADOFF, supra note 22, at 76–82. A recent fifty-state survey by the 
American College of Trusts and Estates Counsel summarizes the status of perpetuities reform: 
 A majority of states have eliminated the rule against perpetuities, either 
entirely or for certain types of trusts, or have adopted a very long fixed permissible 
period of the rule.  
 Louisiana has never had the rule against perpetuities. Instead, trust terms are 
strictly limited by statute, to reflect the Civil Law background of Louisiana law. 
  Eight states have repealed the rule against perpetuities. These states are 
Alaska (repealed the rule for vesting of property interests), Delaware (repealed 
entirely for personal property interest held in trust; 110 year rule for real property 
held directly in trust), Idaho, Kentucky (repealing the rule interests in real or 
personal property), New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota.  
 Nine states have adopted longer fixed periods for the rule against perpetuities, 
sometimes only for certain types of property. These states are Alabama (100 years 
for property not in trust; 360 years for property in trust), Arizona (500 years), 
Colorado (1,000 years), Delaware (110 years for real property held in trust); 
Florida (360 years), Nevada (365 years), Tennessee (360 years), Utah (1,000 
years), Washington (150 years).  
 Seventeen states have retained the rule against perpetuities, but allowed 
certain trusts to continue without application of the rule. These states are Arizona, 
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Virginia, and Wyoming. 
The Rule Against Perpetuities: A Survey of State (and D.C.) Law, ACTEC, at 7–8 
http://www.actec.org/public/documents/studies/zaritsky_rap_survey_03_2012.pdf (last updated 
Mar. 2012); see generally JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, 2012 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING 
tbl.9 (2011) (providing a detailed state-by-state analysis of critical questions associated with the 
Rule). 
 162. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27 
intro. note, at 564 (2011) (“The movement to abrogate the Rule Against Perpetuities has not been 
based on the merits of removing the Rule’s curb on excessive dead-hand control. The policy issues 
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empirical study, Professors Robert Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach 
concluded that repeal or abrogation of the Rule did, in fact, attract trust-
related business in states without an income tax on trust assets: “[T]hrough 
2003, roughly $100 billion in trust funds have poured into the states that 
have validated perpetual trusts,” alongside up to $1 billion in annual 
commissions charged by trustees.163  
Donors found the Rule’s repeal attractive for at least two reasons, one 
more potent than the other. First, perpetuities reform allowed donors to 
indulge in aspirations for immortality and posthumous influence by 
exercising enduring control over gratuitous transfers of property.164 
Second, and more importantly, federal tax reform in 1986 created a 
significant tax advantage for trusts spanning multiple generations: a large 
and perpetual exemption amount under the federal GST tax.165  
The perpetual GST tax exemption arose from Congress’s attempt to 
close a loophole in the federal estate tax.166 The estate tax is imposed on 
transfers taking effect at death and applies to property included in the 
decedent’s gross estate.167 The value of the gross estate includes “the value 
of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the 
time of his death.”168 A life estate held by the decedent is not included in 
the gross estate because it terminates upon the life estate holder’s death 
and, therefore, is not a property interest owned or transferrable by the 
decedent at death.169 Prior to 1986, a settlor could minimize estate taxes by 
creating successive life estates and, so long as the conveyance complied 
with the Rule Against Perpetuities, the conveyance would be taxed only 
                                                                                                                     
associated with allowing perpetual or near-perpetual trusts have not been seriously discussed in the 
state legislatures. The driving force has been the effort to compete for trust industry (financial 
services) business from other states.”); Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or 
Taxes?: Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2474 (2006) (“The 
legislative history and contemporaneous local media coverage of these repeals indicate that their 
purpose was to preserve competitiveness in the jurisdictional competition for so-called dynasty trust 
funds . . . .”). 
 163. Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 26, at 410–11. 
 164. See Tate, supra note 7, at 619 (noting that “some settlors may have truly dynastic 
intentions” and may be “interested in the long-term continuity of their family ‘dynasty’”). 
 165. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 162, at 2467.  
 166. See id. at 2477 (“The 1986 GST tax closed the successive-life-estates loophole by levying 
a tax equal to the highest rate of the estate tax on any generation-skipping transfer.”).  
 167. I.R.C. § 2031(a) (2012). 
 168. Id. § 2033. 
 169. See Estate of Johnson v. Comm’r, 718 F.2d 1303, 1316 n.48 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Life estates 
and other such interests which terminate at death are not reached [by the gross estate].”); John A. 
Miller & Jeffrey A. Maine, The Fundamentals of Wealth Transfer Tax Planning: 2011 and Beyond, 
47 IDAHO L. REV. 385, 393 (2011) (“[I]nterests that are terminable at the decedent’s death, such as 
life interests measured by the decedent’s life or contingent remainders that terminate at death, are 
not included under § 2033.”).  
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once rather than at each successive generation.170 In 1986, Congress closed 
the loophole by enacting the GST tax, which imposed the maximum 
federal estate tax rate “with respect to any generation-skipping transfer.”171 
A transfer skips a generation when it passes to “a natural person assigned 
to a generation which is 2 or more generations below the generation 
assignment of the transferor” or a trust held by such persons.172 The GST 
tax, however, provides an exemption amount equal to the estate tax 
exemption, which, as of 2014, allows every individual to transfer a 
cumulative amount of $5.34 million during life and at death free of federal 
transfer taxes.173 Married couples may elect split treatment of a transfer 
from either spouse to a third party, such that each spouse is treated as 
having given half, which, in effect, doubles the exemption amount to 
$10.68 million.174 The GST tax exemption, therefore, allows a settlor to 
create a perpetual trust (in states permitting such trusts) that will likely 
remain free of federal transfer tax liability forever. 
Empirical analysis of data collected by federal agencies regulating the 
financial services industry compared trust holdings before and after 
enactment of the GST tax; the study produced “[c]onsiderable evidence 
support[ing] the view that the GST tax sparked demand for perpetual trusts 
by giving trust duration greater salience in estate planning.”175 Thus, for 
wealthy individuals, state-level repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities and 
the sizable GST tax exemption proved to be powerful complements—
dynasty trust legislation enabled enduring control over private property 
while federal transfer tax reform rendered it financially advantageous to 
exercise that control.176 
In 2011, the American Law Institute (ALI) approved an official position 
opposing the modern trend toward allowing perpetual and long-term 
                                                                                                                     
 170. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 162, at 2476–77.  
 171. I.R.C. § 2641(a); see text accompanying supra note 165. 
 172. I.R.C. § 2613(a). 
 173. Id. §§ 2631, 2010(c).  
 174. Id. § 2652(a)(2). 
 175. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 162, at 2478; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27 intro. note, at 568 (2011) (“The political 
pressure on the states to remove the limit entirely or to extend the limit to several centuries would 
not have arisen were it not for the artificial incentive created by the GST exemption. In fashioning 
the GST exemption, Congress did not intend to encourage states to modify or repeal state perpetuity 
law to facilitate perpetual or near-perpetual trusts. On the contrary: Congress displayed a lack of 
foresight in relying on state perpetuity law to limit the length of GST-exempt trusts. An unintended 
consequence of tax law should not determine policy on so fundamental a matter as state perpetuity 
law, especially since history suggests that tax loopholes do not last indefinitely.”). 
 176. For a searing and colorful critique of the trend toward allowing perpetual dead hand 
control, see generally MADOFF, supra note 22, at 76–85.  
38
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/2
2015] TRUST TERM EXTENSION 111 
 
trusts.177 Noting that limitations on perpetuities are deeply rooted in 
American legal tradition, the ALI’s statement asserted that trusts of 
limitless duration could yield millions of beneficiaries and “[n]o transferor 
has enough wisdom to make sound dispositions of property across such 
vast intervals and for beneficiaries so remote and so numerous.”178 State 
legislatures, however, have yet to heed the ALI’s warning. No jurisdiction 
that abrogated or repealed the Rule has reinstated limitations on 
perpetuities since the ALI’s pronouncement.179 
Trust term extension, as contemplated in the example provided in the 
Introduction, represents a logical extension of the national trend toward 
repeal and abrogation of the Rule Against Perpetuities in at least three 
respects. First, dynasty trust legislation reinforces the settlor’s prerogative 
to dictate the future use of gifted property and unequivocally favors 
expanding dead hand control over the rights of beneficiaries.180 The 
rationale for trust term extension would rest on similar principles— 
authorizing the impairment of existing beneficial interests for the sake of 
carrying out a broader vision of the settlor’s intent. Second, many states 
abrogated the Rule Against Perpetuities to attract trust business to their 
jurisdictions,181 and because trust term extension would help those states 
retain that business with regard to pre-repeal trusts that would otherwise 
terminate naturally, trust term extension is therefore in line with those 
states policy objectives and the Rule’s repeal. By extending the duration of 
such trusts in perpetuity, states would enjoy the perpetual benefits 
associated with locating the trustee’s situs within their jurisdiction. It is 
also possible that the same financial institutions that lobbied to repeal the 
Rule may also seek to persuade state legislatures to broaden the retroactive 
applicability of the Rule’s repeal. Third, in states that permit retroactive 
                                                                                                                     
 177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27 intro. 
note, at 564 (“It is the considered judgment of The American Law Institute that the recent statutory 
movement allowing the creation of perpetual or near-perpetual trusts is ill advised. The movement 
to abrogate the Rule Against Perpetuities has not been based on the merits of removing the Rule’s 
curb on excessive dead-hand control. The policy issues associated with allowing perpetual or near-
perpetual trusts have not been seriously discussed in the state legislatures. The driving force has 
been the effort to compete for trust industry (financial services) business from other states.”). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Professor Lawrence Waggoner recently proposed another method of curtailing the 
proliferation of perpetual trusts: end the GST tax exemption for them. See Waggoner, supra note 
11, at 2–3, 14–15 (arguing that Congress facilitated the perpetual-trust movement through the GST 
tax advantage, and “[b]ecause Congress has not yet acted to rectify its mistake, the perpetual-trust 
movement is in full bloom”).  
 180. See Tate, supra note 7, at 596 (“These statutes have given rise to a new American legal 
entity: the perpetual dynasty trust, a trust that has the potential to last forever, or for hundreds of 
years . . . . The perpetual dynasty trust gives unprecedented freedom to the settlor, who can now 
extend a dead hand far into the future.”).  
 181. See id. at 603; Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 162, at 2474–75. 
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application of the Rule’s repeal, trust term extension would treat settlors 
who created trusts pre-repeal the same as settlors who created trusts post-
repeal.  
Trust term extension, however, would appear inconsistent with 
legislative intent in jurisdictions prohibiting retroactive application of the 
Rule’s repeal. Many states do limit or prohibit retroactive application182 
and such limitations demonstrate the legislature’s implied unwillingness to 
impair existing beneficial interests for the purpose of expanding dead hand 
control. Courts should therefore construe statutory limits on retroactivity to 
preclude the use of estate planning techniques, such as trust decanting, to 
bypass the legislature’s intent only to repeal the Rule Against Perpetuities 
prospectively. 
States should more carefully consider the costs associated with trust 
term extension. Unlike the prospective authorization of perpetual trusts, 
retroactive authorization of such instruments would harm incumbent 
beneficiaries by impairing the value of their interests. Since financial 
institutions are the driving force behind efforts to authorize perpetual 
trusts, the question is not limited to whether dead hand control should 
override the interests of living beneficiaries. The more relevant inquiry 
may be whether the financial institutions that profit from administering 
perpetual trusts should be given modification powers not contemplated by 
the settlor at the cost of impairing the interests of the settlor’s handpicked 
beneficiaries. At bottom, trusts exist to benefit beneficiaries, not the 
corporate fiduciaries paid to administer them. 
B.  Trust Law Reform: A Modest Retreat from Dead Hand Control 
A contrasting modern trend in trust law embodies features that tend to 
weaken the settlor’s ability to exercise perpetual control over property held 
in trust. This is particularly true of reforms envisioned by national law 
reform organizations such as the ALI and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, responsible for publishing the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code, respectively. 
Noting this trend, Professor Thomas Gallanis183 has argued persuasively 
that “American trust law, after decades of favoring the settlor, is moving in 
a new direction, with a reassertion of the interests and rights of the 
beneficiaries.”184 This new direction of trust law tends to erode dead hand 
control by strengthening the interests and rights of trust beneficiaries in at 
                                                                                                                     
 182. See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 161, at tbl.9. 
 183. Professor Gallanis is the executive director of the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust 
and Estate Acts and he served as Associate Reporter for the Restatement Third of Trusts. Thomas P. 
Gallanis, U. IOWA C. L., http://www.law.uiowa.edu/faculty/thomas-gallanis.php (last visited Sept. 9, 
2014).  
 184. Gallanis, supra note 17, at 216.  
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least four respects: (1) narrowing the scope of spendthrift protection; (2) 
lowering the standard for trustee removal; (3) relaxing the “material 
purpose” standard for early trust termination; and (4) permitting 
administrative deviation without regard to the settlor’s intent.  
These reforms, however, have taken place within a regime that remains 
guided by the principle of honoring the settlor’s intent.185 The settlor is the 
trust’s primary principal and, as such, holds inherent powers to set the ex 
ante constraints governing the beneficiary’s use and enjoyment of trust 
property.186 With regard to the new direction of trust law, state legislatures 
have been slow to embrace the most aggressive reform efforts to contain 
dead hand control, and recent case law reflects continued judicial fidelity 
to settlor intent when beneficiaries seek to upset the settlor’s reasons for 
creating the trust. Thus, while the trust law reform envisioned by the ALI 
and the Uniform Law Commissioners has moved in the direction of 
weakening dead hand control, adoption of the most progressive reform 
measures by state legislatures and courts has moved at a slower pace. 
1.  Spendthrift Protection 
A spendthrift provision allows the settlor to protect interests in trust 
from anticipation by the beneficiary and, in turn, from attachment by the 
beneficiary’s creditors.187 A spendthrift provision disables the beneficiary 
from transferring her trust interest to third parties; also, because the 
protection precludes the beneficiary from alienating her interest, the 
beneficiary’s creditors are likewise precluded from asserting claims against 
it.188 Under Broadway National Bank v. Adams,189 spendthrift protection 
                                                                                                                     
 185. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1, at 
276 (2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is 
the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by 
law.”); UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (2010) (noting that recent reforms governing trust 
modification and termination were drafted with deference to the “principle that preserving the 
settlor’s intent is paramount”).  
 186. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 
683–84 (2004) [hereinafter Sitkoff, Agency Cost Theory] (arguing that the normative claim that 
trust law should minimize agency costs should be qualified by “the ex ante instructions of settlor” 
because such qualification “gives priority to the settlor over the beneficiaries as the trustee’s 
primary principal”). 
 187. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. d, at 360 (2003) (“Spendthrift 
protection prevents anticipation of the beneficiary’s rights but does not extend beyond the point of 
distribution.”); id. § 58, at 355 (providing generally that “if the terms of a trust provide that a 
beneficial interest shall not be transferable by the beneficiary or subject to claims of the 
beneficiary’s creditors, the restraint on voluntary and involuntary alienation of the interest is 
valid”). 
 188. See id. § 58 cmt. a, at 355 (“The term ‘spendthrift trust’ refers to a trust that restrains 
voluntary and involuntary alienation of all or any of the beneficiaries’ interests.”); id. ch. 12, intro. 
note, at 348 (“The rules stated in this Chapter deal with the validity and effect of trust provisions 
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derives from the settlor’s right as “absolute owner of his property” to 
dispose of property with any restriction or limitation not contrary to public 
policy.190 Although spendthrift protection may, in some cases, benefit the 
beneficiary, its justification resides in the settlor’s prerogative to determine 
the nature and extent of the beneficiary’s interest in donated property. 
Highlighting the rule’s deference to the settlor, Professor Gallanis 
observed: “The rule of Broadway National Bank permitted settlors to use 
spendthrift clauses to strip beneficiaries of the power of voluntary and 
involuntary alienation of their interests in trust.”191 Although controversial 
at their inception more than a century ago, spendthrift trusts have come to 
be recognized as valid by all fifty states.192 
The modern trend toward codification of trust law ushered in a wave of 
spendthrift statutes,193 many containing exceptions to and limitations on 
spendthrift protection.194 The Uniform Trust Code, for example, provides 
that a “spendthrift provision is unenforceable against . . . a beneficiary’s 
child, spouse, or former spouse who has a judgment or court order against 
the beneficiary for support or maintenance.”195 California and New York 
enacted statutory exceptions allowing creditors to reach trust income in 
excess of amounts necessary for the beneficiary’s support and education.196 
California also enacted an exception to the enforcement of spendthrift 
protection where “the beneficiary owes restitution to crime victims due to 
                                                                                                                     
imposing forfeiture for voluntary or involuntary alienation of beneficiaries’ interests (§ 57) and 
spendthrift provisions that disable beneficiaries from transferring their interests and their creditors 
from reaching those interests (§§ 58 and 59).”).  
 189. 133 Mass. 170 (1882).  
 190. Id. at 173. 
 191. Gallanis, supra note 17, at 222. 
 192. Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2685 
n.2 (2006); N. Camille Varner, Note, Is the Dead Hand Losing Its Grip in Texas?: Spendthrift 
Trusts and In re Townley Bypass Unified Credit Trust, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 598, 609 n.89 (2010) 
(listing state statutory provisions). 
 193. For a survey of states adopting the spendthrift provisions of the Uniform Trust Code, see 
Barry A. Nelson, Summary of States that Adopted the Uniform Trust Code and Those States’ 
Treatment of Exception Creditors, ACTEC, http://www.actec.org/public/Documents/Studies/
Nelson_UTC_State_Laws_03_21_2013.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2014).  
 194. See Gallanis, supra note 17, at 221–22 (“By legislation, a number of states have imposed 
limitations on the effectiveness of spendthrift clauses, thereby providing some ability for the 
beneficiary to alienate, and creditors to reach, the beneficiary’s interest in the trust.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 195. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503(b)(1) (2010). Eighteen of the twenty-four states that have 
adopted the Uniform Trust Code have adopted this exception in one form or another. See Nelson, 
supra note 193. 
 196. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 15306.5(b), 15307 (West 2014); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW 
§ 7-3.4 (McKinney 2014); see Gallanis, supra note 17, at 222. 
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the beneficiary’s criminal conduct.”197 Taken together, the modern rules 
governing spendthrift trusts now recognize “more circumstances in which 
the beneficiaries must have the obligations of ownership,” including the 
obligation to allow some unpaid creditors to reach the beneficiary’s interest 
in the trust.198 By subjecting the beneficiary’s trust interest to certain 
personal liabilities, newly codified exceptions to the spendthrift rule tend 
to erode the dead hand’s power to insulate trust assets from obligations 
incurred by living recipients.199  
                                                                                                                     
 197. Ventura Cnty. Dep’t of Child Support Servs. v. Brown, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 489, 495 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 2004) (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 15305.5). 
 198. Gallanis, supra note 17, at 222–23; Lynn Foster, The Arkansas Trust Code: Good Law 
for Arkansas, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 191, 230 (2005). Note, however, that some courts 
have limited the proliferation of exceptions to spendthrift protection under the guise of honoring 
settlor intent. For example, courts have deferred to the principle of settlor intent in rejecting 
common law exceptions for tort creditors seeking to attach a beneficiary’s interest in a spendthrift 
trust. See, e.g., Duvall v. McGee, 826 A.2d 416, 422 (Md. 2003) (“The creditors of the beneficiary 
have no right to complain, because the founder of the trust did not give his bounty to them.”); 
Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d 410, 413 (N.H. 2011) (noting that although the “defendant will likely 
remain incarcerated for a period of years . . . the trust’s purpose ‘may still be fulfilled while the 
defendant is incarcerated’” (citation omitted)). But see Sligh v. First Nat’l Bank of Holmes Cnty., 
704 So. 2d 1020, 1029 (Miss. 1997) (“We find, as a matter of public policy, that a beneficiary’s 
interest in spendthrift trust assets is not immune from attachment to satisfy the claims of the 
beneficiary’s intentional or gross negligence tort creditors, and that such claims take priority over 
any remainder interest in such assets.”). The Uniform Trust Code contains no exception for tort 
creditors and the majority rule is against creating a public policy exception for tort creditors. 
HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 224 (2013). 
 199. See Laurene M. Brooks, Comment, A Tort-Creditor Exception to the Spendthrift Trust 
Doctrine: A Call to the Wisconsin Legislature, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 109, 114–15 (1989) (arguing that 
notwithstanding the historical absolute validation of spendthrift provisions, the modern trend “has 
been to ignore the settlor’s intent and carve out public policy exceptions to the spendthrift trust 
doctrine”). Pulling in the opposite direction, however, recent legislation authorizing self-settled 
spendthrift trusts—protection of trust assets from the settlor’s own creditors while allowing the 
settlor to maintain a beneficial interest in the trust—represents an expansion of settlor control. 
Thirteen states have enacted legislation authorizing self-settled spendthrift trusts, discarding the 
traditional rule prohibiting the settlor from using a spendthrift provision to insulate his own assets 
from his own creditors. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 33 (1996) 
(noting traditional public policy prohibitions on self-settled spendthrift trusts, which amount, “in 
essence, to a declaration that one wishes to own one’s assets free of the claims of one’s judgment 
creditors—that is, free of liability”). For a survey of states authorizing domestic asset protection 
trusts, see generally David G. Shaftel, Comparison of the Domestic Asset Protection Trust Statutes, 
ACTEC, http://www.actec.org/public/Documents/Studies/Shaftel-Comparison-of-the-Domestic-
Asset-Protection-Trust-Statutes-Updated-through-April-2014.pdf (last updated Apr. 2014) (charting 
state domestic asset protection trust statutes). While authorization of self-settled spendthrift trusts 
would seem to represent a great expansion of settlor power, “[i]t remains to be seen whether the 
courts of states that adhere to the traditional rule will respect domestic [self-settled asset protection 
trusts].” Sitkoff & Schanzenbach supra note 26, at 384. Recent case law has shown that, where 
settlors have used the device to defraud creditors, courts have responded by setting aside the trust 
conveyances as fraudulent transfers. Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 493 B.R. 798, 816 (Bankr. 
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Trust term extension is inconsistent with the modern trend of 
spendthrift law because it would divest incumbent beneficiaries of both the 
benefits and obligations of ownership. Statutory exceptions to spendthrift 
protection reflect a policy decision to override the settlor’s intent to protect 
trust assets in order to satisfy certain legal obligations of the beneficiary.200 
By contrast, trust term extension would allow the settlor’s intent to 
override the interests of both incumbent beneficiaries and statutorily-
protected creditors of incumbent beneficiaries such as child and spousal 
support judgment holders. For example, a trust might be modified in a way 
that impairs the interests of incumbent residuary beneficiaries to create 
new interests for unborn generations of the settlor’s descendants. If it were 
so modified, that alteration would also impair the rights of creditors of the 
incumbent residuary beneficiaries by limiting recovery to an income 
interest rather than the original residuary interest conveyed by the settlor. 
Unborn descendants of the settlor would have no current creditors, so the 
net effect of trust term extension would be to deprive current creditors of 
the statutory protections against enforcement of a spendthrift provision. 
2.  Trustee Removal 
Trustee removal implicates the extent of dead hand control because the 
issue often arises in cases of disagreement between the beneficiary and 
trustee regarding the settlor’s instructions. Such is the case where the 
beneficiary asks the trustee to override terms imposed by the settlor, the 
trustee refuses, and the beneficiary seeks the trustee’s removal.201 Under 
the common law of trusts, a court could remove a trustee only for cause, 
generally in serious cases of incompetence or misconduct.202 Friction or 
                                                                                                                     
W.D. Wash. 2013) (invalidating self-settled spendthrift trust on fraudulent transfer grounds); 
Battley v. Mortensen (In re Mortensen), No. 09-00565, 2011 WL 5025249, at *8 (Bankr. D. Ala. 
May 26, 2011) (same). While authorization of self-settled spendthrift trusts represents an expansion 
of settlor control, it does not reflect an expansion of dead hand control. The most potent benefits of 
self-settled spendthrift trusts accrue to settlors during their lifetimes and have less to do with 
protecting the interests of beneficiaries. Thus, on balance, these instruments do not significantly 
alter the tension between settlors and beneficiaries. 
 200. Brooks, supra note 199, at 114–15. 
 201. Cf. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 736 (treating trustee removal in the context 
of modification and termination and noting that under modern law, trustee removal “is more freely 
granted, effectively as a modification of the trust, sometimes in circumstances that reveal a tension 
between the intent of the settlor and the wishes of the beneficiary”). 
 202. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts enumerates a nonexhaustive list of grounds for trustee 
removal:  
  [L]ack of capacity to administer the trust . . . ; the commission of a serious breach 
of trust; refusal to give a bond, if a bond is required; refusal to account; the 
commission of a crime, particularly one involving dishonesty; unfitness, whether 
due to old age, habitual drunkenness, want of ability or other cause; permanent or 
 
44
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/2
2015] TRUST TERM EXTENSION 117 
 
disagreement between the trustee and beneficiary, standing alone, was not 
grounds for trustee removal.203 The common law’s high standard for 
removal tended to strengthen dead hand control by preventing beneficiaries 
from installing, at will, a new trustee with less fidelity to the settlor’s 
instructions.204 On the other hand, the high standard for removal tended to 
insulate the trustee from external scrutiny and increase the risk of 
negligence or poor trustee performance.205 The common law standard 
helped preserve the settlor’s influence over the trust, but did so at the cost 
of enabling subpar trustee conduct that adversely affected the 
beneficiaries.206 
Recent reform has modestly expanded the grounds for trustee removal 
while retaining deference to the settlor’s purpose and selection of the 
trustee.207 The Uniform Trust Code reverses the common law rule by 
                                                                                                                     
long-continued absence from the State; the showing of favoritism to one or more 
beneficiaries; unreasonable or corrupt failure to co-operate with his co-trustees.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107 cmt. b, at 235–36 (1959). 
 203. Id. cmt. c, at 236 (“Mere friction between the trustee and the beneficiary is not a sufficient 
ground for removing the trustee unless such friction interferes with the proper administration of the 
trust.”). 
 204. See Ronald Chester & Sarah Reid Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees Under the 
Uniform Trust Code and Other Current Law: Does a Contractual Lense Help Clarify the Rights of 
Beneficiaries?, 67 MO. L. REV. 241, 242 (2002) (“Because changing trustees . . . can be seen as a 
type of trust modification, courts have been hesitant to permit it.”); Gayle B. Wilhelm, Changing 
Horses: Some Thoughts About Removal of Trustees, 18 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 273, 274 (2005) 
(“The [removal for cause rule is] based upon the premise that if the grantor had intended that the 
beneficiaries have the right to remove the trustee without cause, the grantor would have included in 
the governing instrument any one or more of the many common forms of removal clauses. After all, 
the grantor may argue as follows: ‘It is my money, my trust, and it is my right to determine who is 
to carry out my intent. If I wanted my beneficiaries to be able to remove my Trustee, I would have 
given them that power.’”). As Professor Sitkoff observes, “an important consideration for settlors 
when choosing a trustee is the trustee’s expected fidelity to the wishes of the settlor in the future 
exercise of discretion.” Sitkoff, Agency Cost Theory, supra note 186, at 663. 
 205. See generally Chester & Ziomek, supra note 204 (discussing the response of the Uniform 
Trust Code and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts to complaints of beneficiaries “regarding the 
difficulties in removing a corporate trustee”). 
 206. Cf. id. at 250 (“[I]n continuing to hold the settlor’s intent paramount . . . American courts 
and lawmakers are tying the hands of the beneficiaries, whose interests the settlor was originally 
concerned with promoting. To say that a settlor, by naming in his trust a particular bank as trustee, 
intended a special relationship with that trustee, may result in unintended dead hand control 
disadvantaging the beneficiaries.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).   
 207. Professor Sitkoff explains the tradeoff:  
The difficulty, then, is setting the threshold for trustee removal high enough so 
that the trustee can carry out the settlor’s wishes (including the protection of future 
beneficiaries) in the teeth of a contrary preference of the current beneficiaries 
without setting it so high as in effect to sanction shirking or mismanagement. 
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authorizing at will removal of a trustee where “removal is requested by all 
of the qualified beneficiaries, the court finds that removal of the trustee 
best serves the interests of all of the beneficiaries and is not inconsistent 
with a material purpose of the trust, and a suitable cotrustee or successor 
trustee is available.”208 Recent case law shows that beneficiaries have 
successfully sought “no fault” removal where a newly proposed corporate 
trustee offered to charge lower administrative fees and to provide better 
service to the beneficiaries than the incumbent corporate trustee.209 In such 
cases, the risk of undermining the settlor’s intent is minimal because the 
purpose of removal is to improve the trust’s administration rather than 
override restrictions imposed by the settlor.210 
The new rules governing trustee removal give incumbent beneficiaries 
leverage against a trustee seeking to extend the duration of a trust at the 
cost of impairing existing beneficial interests. Under the new removal by 
consent standard, an objecting incumbent beneficiary would be able to seek 
removal of the trustee without proving incompetence or other breach of 
trust.211 A case may arise where the trustee was successful in obtaining 
modification over the beneficiaries’ objection (as explained above, 
equitable deviation does not require the beneficiaries’ consent) or without 
the beneficiaries’ participation in the proceeding. In such a case, incumbent 
beneficiaries could seek the trustee’s removal, post-modification, without 
                                                                                                                     
Sitkoff, Agency Cost Theory, supra note 186, at 663–64. 
 208. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(b)(4) (2010). The Restatement (Third) of Trusts, however, does 
not authorize at will trustee removal upon consent of the beneficiaries. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 37 (2003) (“A trustee may be removed (a) in accordance with the terms of the trust; or (b) 
for cause by a proper court.” (emphasis added)). 
 209. See, e.g., In re McKinney, 67 A.3d 824, 833–34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (allowing the 
replacement of an existing beneficiary where the new beneficiary will, inter alia, “allow for more 
efficient administration of the assets”); Davis v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 243 S.W.3d 425, 430–31 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 210. See McKinney, 67 A.3d at 836 (noting that in the absence of evidence suggesting that a 
settlor contemplated a specific trustee, “the only material purpose that can be served through 
designating a trustee is that the trustee effectively administers the trusts” (emphasis added)). On the 
other hand, trustee removal is more likely to undermine the settlor’s intent when a beneficiary seeks 
removal of the incumbent trustee and proposes herself as the successor trustee. For example, in 
Rapela v. Green (In re Kampros), 289 P.3d 428 (Utah 2012), the Utah Supreme Court explained as 
follows:  
 [W]hen considering removal, courts must give effect to the beneficial interests 
identified in the trust and intended by the trustor, not to the beneficiaries’ 
subjective desires. We therefore reject [the beneficiary’s] contention that the 
district court owed deference to her desire to remove [the trustee] when it 
evaluated the beneficiaries’ best interests.  
Id. at 433. 
 211. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(b).  
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appointing a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of unborn, remote, 
or contingent beneficiaries under the Uniform Trust Code’s qualified 
beneficiary concept.212 Once the trustee is removed and replaced, 
beneficiaries could petition the court to undo the modification. 
3.  Early Trust Termination 
If given the option, many beneficiaries would probably prefer to acquire 
possession of their beneficial interest outright, free of trust. As a general 
rule, however, American trust law has historically protected the settlor’s 
interest in continuing the trust by setting a high standard for early trust 
termination. Under the common law Claflin doctrine, a beneficiary could 
not obtain early termination if a material trust purpose remained to be 
accomplished; this was true even if all beneficiaries consented to 
termination.213 Courts construed this standard broadly, finding a material 
purpose in spendthrift provisions and terms reposing discretion in the 
trustee to distribute income or principal.214 The Claflin doctrine facilitated 
dead hand control by readily inferring the existence of material trust 
purposes that could not be accomplished fully until the trust’s natural 
termination. As Professor Gallanis observed: “Since virtually all modern 
trusts contain discretionary provisions, and most modern trusts contain a 
boilerplate spendthrift clause, the number of trusts in the modern age that 
can be terminated early has been very low.”215  
But the Claflin doctrine’s stringent standard is now on the decline as 
recent reform efforts have strengthened the right of beneficiaries to obtain 
                                                                                                                     
 212. Under the modern rule, a trustee may be removed without cause by consent of all 
qualified beneficiaries, defined as follows: 
[A] beneficiary who, on the date the beneficiary’s qualification is determined: (A) 
is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal; (B) would 
be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the 
interests of the distributees described in subparagraph (A) terminated on that date 
without causing the trust to terminate; or (C) would be a distributee or permissible 
distributee of trust income or principal if the trust terminated on that date.  
Id. § 103(13), at 11. 
 213. Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 455 (Mass. 1889); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
§ 337(2) (1959) (“If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the 
trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its termination.”); Sitkoff, Agency Cost Theory, supra note 
186, at 659. 
 214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 reporter’s notes, at 547–49 (1959) (listing 
cases where beneficiaries could not terminate a trust if termination would defeat the settlor’s 
purpose in creating the trust); Sitkoff, Agency Cost Theory, supra note 186, at 659 (“[C]ourts have 
had little difficulty finding a ‘material purpose’ that would be offended by a modification or 
termination.”). 
 215. Gallanis, supra note 17, at 228. 
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early trust termination.216 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts lowers the 
standard for trust termination with the beneficiaries’ consent in two 
respects. First, the Restatement provides that spendthrift protection and the 
repose of discretion in the trustee should not be presumptively treated as 
implying a material purpose: 
If the interests of one or more of the beneficiaries of a trust 
are subject to restraints on alienation, or if the terms of the 
trust provide support or other discretionary benefits for some 
or all of the beneficiaries, this may supply some indication 
that the settlor had a material purpose—a protective 
purpose—that would be inconsistent with allowing the 
beneficiaries to terminate the trust. Nevertheless, spendthrift 
restrictions are not sufficient in and of themselves to 
establish, or to create a presumption of, a material purpose 
that would prevent termination by consent of all of the 
beneficiaries. This is also true, in many contexts, of 
discretionary provisions.217 
This standard forces the trustee to establish the settlor’s reasons for 
continuing the trust with far greater specificity than under the Claflin 
doctrine, which in effect imposed a presumption against early termination. 
And second, the Restatement allows beneficiaries to compel early 
termination after the settlor’s death where the court finds that the reasons 
for termination outweigh the trust’s material purpose.218 This position 
marks a stark reversal of the Claflin doctrine by allowing beneficiaries to 
override the settlor’s objectives and redefine the trust’s material purpose 
with the court’s approval. 
Like the Restatement, the Uniform Trust Code expresses caution in 
inferring the existence of a material purpose,219 but is otherwise less 
permissive of early trust termination. Unlike the Restatement, the Uniform 
Trust Code does not permit early termination by consent of the 
beneficiaries where the reasons for termination outweigh the material trust 
                                                                                                                     
 216. Tate, supra note 7, at 607.  
 217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. e, at 479 (2003). 
 218. Id. § 65(2), at 473. 
 219. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411 cmt. (2010) (‘“Material purposes are not readily to be inferred. 
A finding of such a purpose generally requires some showing of a particular concern or objective on 
the part of the settlor, such as concern with regard to a beneficiary’s management skills, judgment, 
or level of maturity. Thus, a court may look for some circumstantial or other evidence indicating 
that the trust arrangement represented to the settlor more than a method of allocating the benefits of 
property among multiple [intended] beneficiaries, or a means of offering to the beneficiaries (but 
not imposing on them) a particular advantage. Sometimes, of course, the very nature or design of a 
trust suggests its protective nature or some other material purpose.”’ (quoting the RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. d, at 477 (2003)). 
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purpose.220 As initially drafted, the Uniform Trust Code provided that a 
spendthrift clause “is not presumed to constitute a material purpose of the 
trust,” but after several states declined to adopt the provision, the language 
was placed in brackets and rendered optional.221  
Taken together, the new direction of trust law reform at the national 
level reflects efforts to impose greater limitations on dead hand control by 
lowering the material purpose standard and, in the Restatement’s case, by 
allowing beneficiaries to override a material trust purpose upon 
demonstrating a good reason for early termination. What remains to be 
seen, however, is whether state legislatures and courts will follow the lead 
of law reformers. The Restatement’s balancing test has not been widely 
adopted,222 and no reported judicial decision has granted early termination 
of a private trust at the request of consenting beneficiaries where 
termination was inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust and the 
reasons for termination outweighed the material purpose.223 Early 
indications suggest that the shift toward permitting early termination will 
be gradual.224 Some courts have continued to apply the presumption that 
                                                                                                                     
 220. Id. § 411(b), at 70–71 (“A noncharitable irrevocable trust may be modified upon consent 
of all of the beneficiaries if the court concludes that modification is not inconsistent with a material 
purpose of the trust.”); see also Tate, supra note 7, at 607 (“The Third Restatement, but not the 
UTC, allows a court to modify or terminate a trust even when doing so would contravene a material 
purpose of the settlor, provided that the court determines that the reasons advanced by the 
beneficiaries in favor of modification or termination outweigh the material purpose.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 221. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(c) cmt. 
 222. Cf. Tate, supra note 7, at 607 n.74 (providing that the Restatement’s balancing test “is 
absent in the UTC, possibly because it has little chance of being adopted by state legislatures, which 
are reluctant to thwart the settlor’s intent”). California may have been the first jurisdiction to 
anticipate the Claflin doctrine’s decline. It enacted a standard permitting termination where the 
reasons outweigh the trust’s material purpose in 1990, long before the Restatement (Third) of 
Trust’s promulgation of the standard in 2003. 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. 79 (West) (codified at CAL. 
PROB. CODE § 15403(b) (West 2014) (“If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a 
material purpose of the trust, the trust cannot be modified or terminated unless the court, in its 
discretion, determines that the reason for doing so under the circumstances outweighs the interest in 
accomplishing a material purpose of the trust.”). 
 223. However, in Boys & Girls Club of Petaluma v. Walsh, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 413, 416, 423 
(Dist. Ct. App. 2008), the court found that the reasons for termination of a charitable trust 
outweighed any material purpose in continuing the trust. 
 224. For example, in Vaughn v. Huntington National Bank, Trust Division, No. 
2008AP030023, 2009 WL 342697 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2009), the trust provided beneficiaries 
with monthly income of $250; the beneficiaries sought early termination of the trust and outright 
distribution of the remaining $50,000 in the trust corpus. Id. at *1–2. The court acknowledged the 
Uniform Trust Code comment cautioning against readily inferring material purposes but denied 
early termination because it found that an implied material trust purpose was to ensure that the 
beneficiaries “receive a secure monthly income as long as the corpus of the trust remains.” Id. at 
*4–5 (affirming denial of early termination where beneficiaries consented to outright distribution of 
corpus, but the settlor intended to provide a stream of income akin to an annuity). 
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spendthrift protection constitutes a material trust purpose225 while other 
courts have rejected it.226 Thus, the Claflin doctrine is on the decline but 
not yet obsolete. 
The notion of extending a trust beyond its natural termination and the 
perpetuities period in effect at the time of conveyance represents a marked 
inconsistency with the modern trend’s retreat from the Claflin doctrine. 
Trust term extension would strengthen dead hand control by expanding the 
settlor’s stated objectives at the cost of impairing existing beneficial 
interests. The Restatement’s position on trust termination, however, allows 
beneficiaries to override the settlor’s material purpose, thereby shifting 
control away from the settlor’s dead hand. In jurisdictions that no longer 
readily infer a material purpose from spendthrift provisions or the repose of 
discretion for purposes of trust termination, it would be inconsistent to 
infer from the same provisions evidence of the settlor’s intent to continue 
the trust indefinitely. Trust term extension is therefore inconsistent with the 
Claflin doctrine’s decline and the increased ability of beneficiaries to 
terminate a trust by consent. 
4.  Administrative Deviation 
Under the doctrine of administrative deviation, courts have the power to 
modify an administrative provision of a trust if circumstances 
unanticipated by the settlor threaten to adversely affect operation of the 
trust.227 Older formulations of the doctrine required inquiry into the 
settlor’s intent,228 but the Uniform Trust Code authorizes modification of 
an administrative provision (though not a distributive one) where 
“continuation of the trust on its existing terms would be impracticable or 
wasteful or impair the trust’s administration.”229 The new standard for 
administrative deviation does not require deference to the settlor’s intent. 
The comment to § 412 of the Uniform Trust Code explains that the 
essential purpose of a trust is to serve and benefit the beneficiaries, not 
                                                                                                                     
 225. See, e.g., Buckalew v. Arvest Trust Co., N.A., 425 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Ark. Ct. App. 
2013); Weitzel v. First Citizens Trust Co. (In re Trust Under Last Will & Testament of Weitzel), 
No. 09-0447, 2009 WL 4842807, at *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2009). 
 226. In re Pike Family Trusts, 38 A.3d 329, 331–32 (Me. 2012) (“Prior to 2005, we 
recognized a common law presumption that a spendthrift clause, simply by virtue of its presence, 
was a material purpose of the trust . . . . By enactment of the Maine Uniform Trust Code, effective 
in 2005, the Legislature eliminated this presumption.”). 
 227. See THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASE AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, 
TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 536–39 (5th ed. 2011). 
 228. See Gallanis, supra note 17, at 223–25 (explaining that “[c]onsistent with the Restatement 
(Second), the role of the settlor figures prominently in a leading case on administrative deviation” ). 
 229. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(b) (2010). 
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impose upon others an obligation to carry out unreasonable restrictions.230 
Opining on the doctrine’s lack of deference to settlor intent, Professor 
Gallanis concluded that: 
the doctrine of administrative deviation shows how the new 
direction of American trust law is to rebalance the wishes of 
the settlor with the ownership rights of the beneficiaries. The 
administration of the trust must, in the end, be for the benefit 
of the beneficiaries, and their equitable ownership over the 
trust assets must be respected.231  
Thus, the Uniform Trust Code’s formulation of administrative deviation 
does not bear directly on the issue of trust term extension because it does 
not apply to modification of a distributive provision. Its underlying 
rationale supports a retreat from the principle of dead hand control, 
however, by affirming that the essential purpose of a trust is to serve and 
benefit the beneficiaries. Trust term extension, by contrast, would impair 
the interests of existing beneficiaries for the purpose of expanding rather 
than implementing the settlor’s stated intent. 
C.  Recommendation for Law Reform 
It is highly likely that the drafters of the Uniform Trust Code, 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, and Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills 
and Other Donative Transfers did not contemplate the possibility of trust 
term extension in the context presented in this Article. Had they considered 
the issue, they most likely would have drafted language precluding the 
practice for many of the reasons discussed herein. This Article therefore 
recommends that the Uniform Trust Code be revised to clarify that 
modification doctrines—including equitable deviation and modification to 
achieve the settlor’s tax objectives—do not permit the addition of 
beneficiaries not identified in the original trust instrument. Prohibiting the 
addition of new beneficiaries would resolve the question of whether a trust 
could be extended in perpetuity because the duration would be limited to 
the lifespan of the beneficiaries identified by the settlor. 
CONCLUSION 
Widespread repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities has prompted 
creative estate planning practitioners to contemplate whether an 
                                                                                                                     
 230. Id. § 412 cmt. at 77 (“Although the settlor is granted considerable latitude in defining the 
purposes of the trust, the principle that a trust have a purpose which is for the benefit of its 
beneficiaries precludes unreasonable restrictions on the use of trust property. An owner’s freedom 
to be capricious about the use of the owner’s own property ends when the property is impressed 
with a trust for the benefit of others.”). 
 231. See Gallanis, supra note 17, at 226. 
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irrevocable trust settled pre-repeal could be transformed into a perpetual 
trust post-repeal. For example, where there is evidence that the settlor 
wanted to create a perpetual trust to benefit several generations of unborn 
descendants but chose not to because of the perpetuities period in effect at 
the time of conveyance, a trustee might argue that, had the settlor 
anticipated the Rule’s repeal, he would have created a perpetual trust. The 
trustee would further argue that, under the doctrine of equitable deviation, 
courts have the power to modify a trust to effectuate the settlor’s intent 
notwithstanding objections of existing beneficiaries. By allowing a trust 
with identifiable residuary beneficiaries to be transformed into a trust of 
perpetual (or near-perpetual) duration, equitable deviation would arguably 
allow all settlors to be treated equally without regard to whether the trust 
was created before or after the Rule’s repeal.  
This Article articulates four reasons why resorting to equitable 
deviation in this manner would represent a misapplication of the doctrine. 
First, courts generally do not apply equitable deviation where the proposed 
modification would impair existing beneficial interests. Trust term 
extension would impair existing beneficial interests because, to create a 
perpetual trust, incumbent residuary beneficiaries would be forced to 
accept a less valuable lifetime interest in the trust. Second, equitable 
deviation exists to implement the settlor’s intent as it existed at the time of 
conveyance by modifying terms of the original instrument in light of 
unanticipated circumstances; by contrast, trust term extension would not 
only modify the original instrument’s terms but would also allow for 
reconsideration of the settlor’s original intent. Third, extending the 
duration of an existing trust into perpetuity would undermine the trust law 
requirement of an ascertainable beneficiary. And fourth, application of 
equitable deviation in this context would present an unnecessary risk of 
misinterpreting the settlor’s intent under circumstances where the trust 
could be administered according to its original terms without frustrating 
the original trust’s purpose. 
Within the larger context of reform movements affecting the law of 
perpetuities and the broader law of trusts, the idea of trust term extension 
implicates complex questions about the permissible extent of donor control 
and the purpose of donative trusts. On one hand, some states have repealed 
the Rule Against Perpetuities retroactively, implying a legislative intent to 
permit the conversion of pre-repeal trusts into post-repeal perpetual trusts. 
In states prohibiting retroactive application of the repeal, however, it would 
follow that pre-repeal trusts should not be modified or decanted in a way 
that would violate the perpetuities period in effect at the time of 
conveyance. On the other hand, legal reform in the broader law of trusts 
has marked a modest retreat away from dead hand control in at least four 
respects relevant to trust term extension: spendthrift protection, trustee 
removal, trust termination, and administrative deviation.  
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On balance, the idea of extending a trust beyond the perpetuities period 
in effect at the time of conveyance and creating new beneficial interests for 
unborn descendants of the settlor should be an exercise of creative thinking 
rather than creative estate planning. Trust term extension of this sort is 
inconsistent with modern trends in the broader law of trusts; also, to the 
extent that states have authorized retroactive application of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities, there is no evidence suggesting that legislatures 
foresaw the use of modification doctrines like equitable deviation to impair 
existing beneficial interests. The new direction of trust law increasingly 
recognizes the rights of beneficiaries, particularly when those rights stand 
in conflict with restrictions imposed by the settlor’s dead hand. Trust term 
extension, under the illustration presented in this Article, would unfairly 
resurrect the dead hand and allow it to impair the interests of incumbent 
beneficiaries for the sake of conferring benefits upon individuals selected 
by the trustee rather than settlor. Worse yet, although proponents of trust 
term extension may purport to represent the interests of the settlor’s dead 
hand, in many cases, such proponents may in fact be financial institutions 
furthering their own pecuniary interests in administering perpetual trusts. 
With regard to law reform, the drafters of the Uniform Trust Code might 
consider a revision clarifying that modification doctrines do not permit the 
addition of new beneficiaries not identified in the original trust instrument. 
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